THE
NATION

FEBRUARY 21, 1959 . . 25c

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IF WE WANT PEACE—

Barriers and Prospects

— A Special Issue —

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LETTERS

The Stanford Way

Dear Sirs: I have noted your editorial, "Group Think: About What?" [January 24 issue], which implies that at the research organizations mentioned, "There is . . . one absolute prohibition, and that is thinking which would tend toward . . . the enhancement of life." If this assertion was intended to apply to Stanford Research Institute, I feel that some correction of the record is in order.

Specifically, your editorial indicates that no attention is presently being devoted to such problems as cancer research and "how to take up the slack in employment if peace should break out." In fact, Stanford Research Institute is presently conducting an active program in cancer research which involves the synthesis, screening and testing of thousands of potential chemical anti-cancer agents. . . . Adjustment to the effects of armaments reduction has long been a matter of concern to the Institute. Although the Institute has not been able, to date, to find sponsorship for a fomal study on this vital problem, it continues to be a subject of active discussion here.

Stanford Research Institute has consistently taken the position that research is a tool which has tremendous potential application in solving some of the human problems confronting this nation and the world. Defense research is helping the United States buy time. However, unless the time bought can be used to good advantage, our nation's defense efforts will have been wasted. In this context, the Institute has sought, and will continue to seek, projects which will make significant contributions to the broader benefit of mankind. . . .

E. Finley Carter
Director, Stanford Research Institute

Menlo Park, Calif.

A Look in the Mirror

Dear Sirs: Thanks for the honest bit of light! Carleton Beals's summary of the present Cuban "war crimes" trials [*The Nation*, January 24] is a timely, necessary reply to much dishonest moralizing by our government and press.

No humanist can contest against any *honest* program or effort to rid our civilizations of the barbaric ritual of offering human sacrifices in propitiation of social abstractions. But a view which condemns the other fellow for his "revolutionary excesses," but countenances the "ultimate penalty" in our system of law, cannot be respected as honest sentiment.

Secondly, our bedfellow, see-no-evil complicity in the crimes of the Batista regime lends an unsavory flavor to the pleas of our government and press. . . .

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

New York City

Mr. Eaton's Proposals

Dear Sirs: Heartiest congratulations on your magnificent and thorough Eaton spread—[January 31 issue]. It is in timely and refreshing contrast to the oceans of superficial, half-baked, inconclusive tripe that now flood the air waves and the pages of our periodical press.

Ellis O. Jones

Washington, D.C.

Dear Sirs: Your article on Cyrus Eaton and his "platform" have done a great service to our country and the world. The "platform" is the most comprehensive and intelligent of anything I have read. . . . It is as if a light had broken through the darkness.

Frederic H. Atwood

Fort Myers, Florida

World's Malaise

Dear Sirs: I cannot resist congratulating Rita Hinden on her essay "Golden Age of Misery," in your December 13 issue. I have not read anywhere such a compact and penetrating analysis of the malaise that currently characterizes the Western world and is soon to contaminate the remainder.

Thomas F. Deahl
University of Minnesota

Minneapolis, Minnesota

Witty—or Wicked?

Dear Sirs: Congratulations on Eve Merriam's bold, intelligent and witty "Are Housewives Necessary?" in your January 31 issue. It comes as a breath of fresh air after all the stale clichés being pumped into present day culture, not only from the side of the TV screen, but also, and as Miss Merriam indicates, from sociologists themselves. . . .

Jane Mayhall

Brooklyn, N. Y.

Dear Sirs: As a psychiatrist in private practice, I wish to take much exception to Eve Merriam's facetious article. Women's place is in the home. Not because there is not much room for them in other places, but because their function in our society has been either grossly exaggerated or grossly misrepresented.

As a married man and a husband, with a busy housewife and two children, I have been listening to the comments of my dear wife, who has read this article.

I. Leo Fishbein

Miami Beach, Fla.

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The Nation, Feb. 21, 1959. Vol. 188, No. 8

The Nation, published weekly (except for omission of four summer issues) by The Nation Company and copyright 1959, in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14, N. Y. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

Subscription Prices Domestic—One year $8, Two years $14, Three years $20. Additional postage per year, Foreign and Canadian $1.

Change of Address: Three weeks' notice is required for change of address, which cannot be made without the old address as well as the new.

Information to Libraries: The Nation is indexed in Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Index to Labor Articles, Public Affairs, Information Service, Dramatic Index.

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NEW YORK, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1959
VOLUME 188, No. 8

THE NATION

IF WE WANT PEACE—

It is strange that, in a time when the sentiment for peace is universal, there is no real peace and no real movement for peace. But though it is strange, it is not inexplicable. The sentiment for peace is pious and toothless; a movement for peace, on the contrary, would threaten basic assumptions in an astonishing variety of our institutions. And these institutions are not without weapons. Let a man move from *approval* of peace to *action* for peace and he will find himself at odds with built-in responses, obsolete slogans, ossified political attitudes, vested economic interests, bipartisan political accords—a whole panoply of arms to defend the age from the disruptions of peace. He will find himself tagged "crackpot," "naive," "soft on communism"; and unless he is a very bold citizen he will quickly retreat to the safe position of cheering for peace in the abstract.

Small wonder, then, that budgets for arms continue to grow in perfect accord with the growing sentiment for peace. The arms race will not stop, and new policies will not be initiated, until that sentiment finds effective political expression. It is the purpose of this special issue to focus attention on some of the formidable barriers to this translation. The issue is *not* concerned with the specific direction such a policy might take; many excellent proposals have been advanced and each week brings more. Nor is it concerned with the arms sector of the economy *per se;* this we intend to explore in a later issue. The essays here published are all directed, from different viewpoints, toward clearing the ground for a politics of peace.—THE EDITORS

NEEDED:

Production for Peace . . *by William Appleman Williams*

THERE COMES a time when a society has to define and discuss fundamental issues with candor and vigor or else the momentum of its outworn ideas and current mistakes carries it on to disaster. On this crucial front, America seems to be lagging about three years behind the Soviet Union. Apparently realizing these facts, and aware of their implications, a few of our leaders such as Senator Fulbright, Walter Lippmann and Adlai Stevenson are belatedly challenging the common assumption that the Russians are to blame for all our troubles. They are saying instead that our difficulties have been brewing for a long time, and that we bear our own responsibilities for them.

These critics are correct on both counts. Ever since the 1890s, Americans have been building (and absentmindedly adding to) a corporate industrial society. Since this corporate society is what most of our leaders set out to construct, and what the rest of us have accepted, it seems rather foolish not to discuss it openly. For while such euphemisms as The Establishment, The Stalemate State and the Welfare-Warfare State are witty and insightful, they are really not effective substitutes for analysis and reflection.

The greatest bugaboo inhibiting such essential study is an intellectual hangover from the decade of the 1930s; in short, the syllogism which holds that a corporate society is the same thing as fascism or nazism. Only a frontal attack can resolve this confusion. For while a corporate society can *become* Fascist or Nazi (hence the gnawing concern among liberals and conservatives—as well as radicals—that it might happen here), *by definition it is neither, nor does it of necessity become either.* Indeed, just the opposite; for a corporate so-

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ciety has no chance whatever to function satisfactorily unless it honors in practice the principle of political democracy. Having clarified these points, it should be possible to talk about a corporate society without confusion or self-consciousness.

Fundamentally, a corporate society is a combination of certain central features of feudalism with industrial capitalism. It takes from feudalism the following basic ideas and principles of organization and action: First, an emphasis on the organic unity of society, perhaps best expressed by a sixteenth-century English divine, "God alters no law of Nature"; second, a purposeful organization and integration of that unity in such forms as the guild and the manor; third, an overt and implied system of rights and duties topped off by the concept of *noblesse oblige;* fourth, a universal idea and ideal which leads to a generalized code of conformity, and which justifies (if it does not engender) crusades against the non-believer. Culminating in the absolute monarchy of Elizabeth, feudalism in the Western world produced the image and much of the practice of an integrated national state based on responsibilities and freedoms held and observed by all sections of society.

IN THE beginning, of course, and for sometime afterwards, industrial capitalism aimed consciously to overthrow feudalism. But the new system also functioned to destroy the anarchy it so righteously proclaimed. For one thing, the division of labor so essential to rational and profitable production created a vast complex of interrelated rights and responsibilities which bound men together again. For another, competition worked in practice to destroy competition and thus to create an order characterized by large, highly-organized units.

By the end of the nineteenth century, this new system dominated by the large corporations was in trouble. Contrary to its theory, it was not functioning automatically. Recurrent crises plagued the supposed harmony of interests. In response, leaders of large corporations asserted their natural mandate (an industrial *noblesse oblige,* as it were) to stabilize the system. Other basic units of the political economy soon organized themselves as conscious counterweights to the corporation. Most workers accepted the system, and so followed Samuel Gompers instead of Eugene Debs. Farmers were a bit slower, but the end result was the same, as exemplified in the later Grange movement and the National Farm Bureau Federation.

Only the small businessman and the consumer failed to organize with equal effectiveness. As a substitute, they turned more and more to still another group asserting its leadership. This was an elite of Easterners and Southerners who saw themselves as native American aristocrats in the tradition of the trustee and the squire. They were quite conscious of a historic link with feudalism, and their program was quite in keeping with the concept and traditions of *noblesse oblige.*

Allying themselves first with one, then with another, combination of the basic groups in American society, these indigenous artistocrats and their intellectual fellow-travelers provided spirited guidance for America's developing corporate society. Under their leadership, the national government came to play two vital roles: (1) just as in the days of Elizabethan England, it rendered economic assistance at home and abroad, and translated the principles of *noblesse oblige* into welfare legislation; and (2) it became a rather sophisticated forum where the various elements of the corporate society formalized their compromises.

The parallel with feudalism cannot be ignored. Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, and then rapidly picking up form and momentum under Theodore Roosevelt, this trend toward legal charters spelling out rights and duties had embraced, by 1958, every major sector of America's industrial capitalism. In addition to the anti-trust legislation, the corporation community was defined by such items as the Federal Reserve Act and the Securities Exchange Commission. Labor moved from the Clayton Act through Section 7 (a) of the NIRA and the Wagner Act to its general charter in the Taft-Hartley Law. Having checked the railroads, the farmers progressed through Wilson's Federal Farm Loan Act to the Soil Bank and the principle and profitable practice of parity under the New and Fair Deals. For their part, the small businessmen and other relatively diffused groups have effectively appealed to the Congress and the Executive for negative protection and positive assistance. Meanwhile, unemployment compensation and social-security legislation have steadily expanded.

IT SEEMS CLEAR that America's corporate society is well-defined both in theory and practice. Three factors have made the system work as well as it has: (1) the theoretical and administrative ability of the aristocratic leadership; (2) the *a priori* existence and tradition of political democracy, which gave the less powerful groups a non-violent means of keeping the system from getting completely out of balance; and (3) the availability of fantastic domestic and overseas wealth, which prevented the economic stagnation and social dislocation of industrial capitalism. It seems very probable that the wealth has been the *key* factor. Professor Galbraith makes this point very simply, saying it has been the increase in the wealth, "not the redistribution of income, which has brought the great material increase, the well-being of the average man." And Sir Francis Bacon noted, in the Age of Elizabeth, that this is the classic way to prevent "Seditions and Troubles."

Galbraith goes on to drop an intellectual bomb with his remark that this wealth has only been "regularly achieved during war or under the threat of war." Not only does the statistical record bear him out, but so, too, does the testimony of the leaders. Harry Hopkins expressed the general feeling as of late 1939 and early 1940: "With twelve million unemployed, we are socially bankrupt and politically unstable." Ten years later, Dean Acheson reaffirmed the basic outlook: "The problem which confronts us can be stated very simply: To maintain the volume of

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American exports which the free world needs and which it is our national interest to supply as a necessary part of building a successfully functioning political and economic system, the free world must obtain the dollars to pay for these exports."

IT IS important at this point not to veer off into a discussion of the relationship between this outlook and the way America entered the wars of the twentieth century. That question is most certainly relevant, but here the problem is to examine how the Cold War has in fact served to sustain, rationalize and tighten this corporate system which already existed. The evidence appears definitive: everyone seems to agree that the Cold War has insured the expansion and the success of America's mid-century industrial capitalism.

Professor Seymour Melman of Columbia University provides a classic summary of the situation. He concludes that 15 per cent of the labor force was "engaged in work on military orders" in 1956 (and that the percentage was even higher in the skilled trades). That year's defense budget, he adds, financed about 30 per cent of the nation's scientific research and development, and about 37 per cent of industry's activities in those areas. Melman's broader conclusions are equally striking: (1) since the late 1930s, "Large-scale orders for military material have become a regular part of the strategies of both management and unions in handling their particular problems"; and (2) "Both management and labor have become accustomed to treating military orders as a device for maintaining production, profits, and employment."

Early in 1947, *before* he enunciated his famous doctrine, President Truman made it clear that policy-makers were thinking along similar lines. "There is no intention to sacrifice one group to benefit another group," he explained. "Negotiations will be directed toward obtaining larger markets, both foreign and domestic, for the benefit of all." Two and a half years later, after the approach had been developed extensively, Harvard economist Sumner Slichter offered his judgment: "The Cold War with Russia is a good thing. It increases the demand for goods, helps sustain a high level of employment, accelerates technological progress, and thus helps the country raise its standard of living." And after hearing first-hand testimony in the early 1950s, one Congressman offered this conclusion: "So the net result is that the government, with its contracts, has enabled your private enterprise to sky-rocket."

Labor's attitude was favorable. William Green argued that America "must have a showdown with Russia before world peace can be firmly established." Walter Reuther's approach was more sophisticated, but his support for the Cold War was never in doubt. Among the rank-and-file, the attitude of one steel worker in Gary was by no means atypical: "Things are always a little dull when there's no war going on." While quite sincere in its assertion that it had "no vested interest in international discord," the International Association of Machinists nevertheless supported the Cold War, its leaders defining labor's role in this stirring cry: "Everyman to his particular battle station." As for coexistence, the union described it as an insidious version of appeasement, and offered this judgment: "The whole idea that maybe we can live at peace with the Communists makes us uneasy."

Small businessmen were equally peace-loving and equally committed to the Cold War. Starting from the fact that 16 per cent of America's small businesses failed in the first two years after Pearl Harbor, the National Association of Independent Business (a group of New Deal-type businessmen) has maintained steady pressure on the Government for a larger share of Cold War contracts.

Carey McWilliams has described and analyzed this campaign in *The Nation*, June 30, 1956: "It has been the expectation of *more* defense work, rather than any actual benefits received, that accounts for the surprising number of cold warriors in the ranks of the small businessmen." And as might be expected, smaller cities and towns organized *as communities* to obtain military orders.

From the Midwest comes perhaps

Herblock

"Can't We Do Something More Than Just Stand Firm?"

the most straightforward summary of the entire situation. (If this be isolation, then think twice before damning it!) The lead editorial in the Milwaukee *Journal* of May 11, 1958, asked the key question: "Can We Afford Real Peace?" "The desperate fact," concluded the editors, "is that the economy is not at all a 'normal' peacetime economy. It is a war economy in almost every sense except the lack of fighting. And it has come to *depend,* to a frightening degree, on the colossal stream of military spending that is poured into it. And it is from even *this* kind of unsound, unconstructive basis that the economy has disturbingly 'receded'."

DESPITE this sort of biting commentary, many Americans remain confident that our problems are solved, and exhibit a marked reluctance toward a *détente* with Russia. Both reactions are superficial and dangerous. There are at least five major reasons why the situation is sure to change, and hence why Americans should begin immediately to formulate alternatives:

1. *Russia is changing.*

This means, very simply, that the Cold War may collapse in our face. It may well become incidental to the Russians because, feeling strong enough to ignore it, they will choose to move on to other major problems and begin to develop the many creative opportunities they have neglected for the past forty years. Any effort by America to sustain the Cold

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War under those not inconceivable circumstances would quickly and literally isolate the United States. And that very probably means war.

Even if developments in Russia do not proceed that far, it is clear that Soviet society is a far more complex and dynamic structure than we have believed these past fifteen years. Our old model is simply irrelevant. As José Ortega y Gasset once remarked, a nation "goes on living by having a program for the future"—and the Russians and the Chinese have one. We had better develop our own instead of leaning on theirs.

2. *The Cold War evinces a dangerous logic and momentum which point toward nuclear war.*

This is true in two respects. First, human beings have limited endurance and almost unlimited capacity for honest mistakes. Within another five years, either side could become exasperated; and it seems unnecessary to catalogue the opportunities for accidental war. Second, America's corporate system is not producing the rapid, balanced development of poorer societies. The continuance of that failure will certainly accentuate all the dangers inherent in the existing tension between Russia and America; and it just might verify Marx's prophecy on a world scale (in which eventuality there is not much question as to which nation would benefit).

3. *A technological revolution is subverting even the existing artificial balance within America's corporate system.*

Dean Acheson is right: "At present the economic system of the free world is not in good shape." There are so many aspects to this factor that they deserve a separate article (as do many of the other themes in this essay). But the most significant can be outlined rather easily.

First, automation and other new productive advances create more wealth with less labor and hence raise in inescapable form the problem of imbalance between labor and capital and the issue of sustaining the general demand for production itself. Between April and September, 1958, factory production rose 9 per cent while employment of production workers rose only 2 per cent. "Joblessness will remain high," warns the AFL-CIO, "even when past peaks of economic activity are again achieved. Such levels can no longer sustain full employment because of the growth of the labor force and of the impact of improved technology."

Second, the agricultural revolution (which has already produced such a crisis in that sector of the economy). We have today enough surplus wheat to meet our domestic and foreign demand for two years. At the same time, people who want to farm are being driven off the land. It is easy to say that we could (and should) give that and more away in two minutes. But though unquestionably moral (and probably practical as a one-shot solution to the immediate dilemma), such an answer provides no rational solution to the long-range domestic problem or the challenge of a hungry world.

Third, the changing nature of warfare—which in a sense is an aspect of automation. There is a great deal of money to be made by a few giant corporations, such as General Dynamics and General Motors, in the production of missiles and associated hardware; but the new strategy cuts into the profit margin of many other large corporations, into the heart of many small outfits, and into the very existence of jobs for thousands of workers. Perhaps history has a great irony in store for us: Unable to get peace on moral grounds, we may get it out of economic causes.

Fourth, any effort to correct for these revolutions by extending and tightening-up the American system overseas will serve only to reinforce other imbalances that exist. It very probably would not work economically, and it most certainly will not work socially and politically. About 15 per cent of current corporate profits are derived from overseas operations, and there is a great deal of talk about enlarging this in keeping with the practice of the old British Empire. Among the many fallacies of that approach, perhaps the most telling one is the most obvious —this is no longer the nineteenth century. The natives are not only literate and organized, but they also have jet-liner connections to Moscow and Peking.

4. *The morale of the country's corporate society is manifesting serious weaknesses.*

So much has been written about the apathy, the unfocused discontent, the outright rebellion of many youths, and the rise of labor-capital bitterness, that extended documentation would be redundant. "The Myth of the Happy Worker," as Harvey Swados called it in *The Nation,* August 17, 1957, has one foot in the same graveyard that holds the Myth of the Self-Made Man. The truth of the matter is that we are very much closer than we like to admit to being a shook-up society—not just a generation. Unhappily, Marx seems to have been right in his crucial prophecy about the progressive alienation of man under mature industrial capitalism.

DESPITE this sobering impact, each of these difficulties harbors a potential strength. They dramatize the crisis and offer openings for creative and vigorous leadership—*and participation.* It is worth-while to outline a few of them:

1. *The possibilities of a peace movement seem rather good.*

Primarily, as C. Wright Mills has dramatized, it is simply time to assert our refusal as human beings to tolerate a policy which points so obviously toward disaster. Secondly, the issue offers a positive, creative alternative to the malaise from which we suffer. Britain's Norman Mackenzie has said it all in just the right words: "It is worth-while to think clearly, believe honestly, act decisively. It is worth-while, because only so can we give meaning to our lives and purpose to our society."

Finally, in this connection, Communist overtures and our own economic difficulties coincide to suggest an extension of trade with that half of the world which we now ignore. Here the cold warriors are impaled upon a dilemma of their own choosing, and their discomfort should be exploited. For if it is true, as they are so fond of arguing, that world trade is the key to peace, then it follows that we should be trading heavily with Russia, China and Eastern Europe. Under Secretary of State Dillon's recent efforts to explain this contra-

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diction are less than convincing. He argues that the Russians do not need any credit; and even if they did, we cannot be expected to lend to people who fail to pay old debts. By his own logic, however, neither England, France, nor West Germany needed any of the money we loaned them; and if we ever started refusing loans to those who have defaulted, we would overnight have such a budgetary surplus that even Calvin Coolidge could rest easy in his grave. And in view of Russia's contribution to our escape from an Axis victory, the act of raising the issue of paying for Lend-Lease is uncharitable even for a banker.

2. *The obvious necessity is to settle down to some hard thinking about what to do with our own problems.*

Embarrassing as it may (and certainly *should*) be, it is now ninety-six years since Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. There is a certain irony in this issue, for if nothing else it proves that a nation can exist half free and half in fetters for a very long time indeed. But the main point is to get on with the emancipation. And in very much the same vein, it is time for our labor leaders to show some concern over what they make as well as how much they get out of it. This, after all, is the key issue, because it has consequences and ramifications that make the problem of administered prices look like a minor distraction. As for education, any society which blithely accepts the idea that its children can be educated as human beings as satisfactorily by television as by live men and women needs to stop everything and pinch itself to see if it has dozed off for good. But the list of domestic issues is interminable! Any bright graduating senior—let alone the graduate students—can talk to you about it for hours.

3. *The truly essential need is to re-examine our conception of saving other peoples and societies.*

One example should be sufficient in this area. For just about 100 years we Americans saw China as a society whose needs and wants would guarantee our prosperity, and whose backwardness would provide our superior virtue with a perpetual Sunday School class. It would seem that the results should make us cautious about repeating that approach. Perhaps it has.

Nevertheless, a very great deal of the talk about helping India nowadays bears a disturbing similarity to our earlier attitude toward China. Might it not be wise, if we are determined to save India and to make it a footnote in proof of the American Way, at least to consider undertaking the venture through the United Nations? Everyone would know the money came from us, but they would also know that we trusted other human beings enough to let them save themselves.

And that just might be a gesture which would help us save ourselves.

NEEDED:

The Courage to Debate . . *by Urban Whitaker*

ONE WAY of describing how the Cold War has become an institution in our national life is to look at the behavior of an elected federal official. Take, as an instance, Senator Henry Jackson (Dem., Wash.). The President had hardly unveiled the new budget when the Senator tore into it with a wide open bank book and billions of dollars worth of military ideas. At a time when many experts believe that we could and should reduce military expenditures in favor of foreign economic aid, domestic education and other projects, Senator Jackson seems to be a prisoner of the Cold War economy. His plight can be described in about four words: Fort Lewis, Bremerton, Boeing and Hanford (which translate: Army, Navy, Air Force and nuclear weapons).

It is possible that the federal-defense money pouring into these and other major projects in the State of Washington has nothing to do with the Senator's constant pressure for budgetary increases. He may still believe that there is something important to be gained by increasing the size of the armed forces and speeding up the production of various weapons of mass destruction. Yet the fact remains that if he didn't believe in the kind of budget that would keep his state well supplied with soldiers, sailors and defense contracts, he might very well become an ex-Senator.

Weapons production is, of course, only one aspect of the international political climate and it would be naive to say that our troubles would disappear even if our defense budget were entirely abolished. However, to the degree that money spent elsewhere could contribute to the easing of international tensions, and to the degree that arms production may be antithetical to that goal, some progress could be made by de-institutionalizing the economy of the Cold War.

This is a difficult assignment. One of the most unfortunate facts about the Cold War is that its durability has increased as rapidly as its utility has decreased. While it has become progressively more dangerous, it has also become so central a part of the national economy that a major effort will be required to dislodge it. In addition, its institutionalization has been accompanied by the development of a new propensity for silence among potential leaders of public opinion whose best thinking has led them along unpopular paths.

We cannot begin to reorient our economy or to construct any of the other ramparts of peace until we change certain attitudes now dominant on the American scene. It seems to me that at least four prerequisites must be attained before the people of the United States will be ready to proceed with this task.

1. *The first prerequisite to peace is the reformation of American liberalism.*

Some liberals now counsel us to *think* like liberals but to stop *talking* about it because that only draws the heavy fire of entrenched conservatives and reactionaries, and attracts discredit to the liberal cause. On the contrary, what we desper-

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ately need is precisely that atmosphere in which both the Right and the Left will expect — *but will not fear* — each other's counterpoint.

No society in which any honest thought is blanketed by silence can expect continued health. Since the seventeenth century we have always been blessed with a wealth of courageous opposition. That we have in very recent years allowed that tradition to lapse has led us to the brink of intellectual impoverishment — a brink of far more consequence than any to which we may have been led by Mr. Dulles.

2. *There should be "a more searching public discussion of the implications of a third world war, so that all people, realizing its shocking moral as well as physical consequences, will be more resourceful in finding means to establish world order."*

These words were originally written for *The Nation* by Grenville Clark on December 16, 1950. They have perhaps become less pressing in view of the measurable progress toward this goal which has accumulated during the decade. Yet in terms of its influence on public policy very little has been done to translate our *understanding* of the nuclear stalemate into *action* designed to control it. We have had the "searching public discussion," we have been "shocked" and we have begun to realize such nuclear "implications" as the growing irrelevance of military conflict and the elevated importance of psychological "war." We have not yet become very "resourceful in finding means to establish world order."

These pages have often reflected the view that Hiroshima marked the end of politically effective military conflict and that we are impelled by technological circumstances to pursue international conflict on a new plane. Public sentiment generally has begun to reflect this understanding. The 1958 Congressional elections in Vermont and Colorado even indicate that it might be beginning to influence public action.

Yet we cannot ignore the fact that the public conduct of such influential Senators as Jackson of Washington, Stuart Symington of Missouri and many others continues to reflect an outdated obsession with the unstemmed growth of armaments. The major energies of the United States continue to be expended on an unnecessarily large "defense" budget which makes us more and more able to fight a war which both sides want less and less. Too many Americans are satisfied to accept this paradox as inevitable and do not turn enough of their attention to its opposite number: we are growing less and less able to afford the more and more necessary ingredients of peace.

3. *We must change our image of ourselves. We must be sufficiently aware of our own fallibility to realize that we could be defeated by international communism. And we must be willing to accept some compromises in the formation of our national objectives.*

No one else any longer believes in the myth of American omnipotence and the more we insist on it the more we handicap our national policy. If we are denying ourselves one source of strength by an outdated trust in armed force, we are courting an even greater weakness by clinging to an image of ourselves which never was accurate.

The penalty for an inaccurate self-image can be complete defeat. Hitler and Napoleon are only two of the more prominent monuments to this sort of misunderstanding, and it will not do to dismiss either example on the ground that they were military aggressors and we are not. Our struggle for survival is neither military nor initiated by us. But it makes little difference who starts the conflict or what kind of contest it is. If either side in any kind of combat overrates its abilities, that fact may be decisive in the outcome. I have not brought up the subject of defeat because I think it is likely, but because I am convinced that the way to make it most unlikely is to realize that it is possible.

What is called for is an accurate judgment of possibilities. One of the few basic axioms of international politics is that a nation's commitments must be kept in balance with its power. In seeking that balance, the Government of the United States must be free to conduct a continuous reassessment of the nation's basic aims. *Whenever, in making that judgment, the government finds that it is not possible to increase national power, it must be free to decrease national commitments.*

What we must develop is a *willingness to compromise.* This is particularly difficult to do because the line between compromise and appeasement, like the line between self-confidence and overconfidence, is a hard one to draw. However, the Cold War will not be ended, international tension will not be lessened and the politics of peace will not come to pass, until there is compromise on both sides of every brink-front. We can persist in avoiding compromise— but if we do we are stuck with the Cold War.

4. *We must accept the possibility that international communism has a capacity for reform and that "moral" communism might be used effectively against us.*

It subtracts sufficiently from our image of the real world that we think we are, or can become, strong enough to control it without compromise. But when we add to the vision of omnipotence the companion vision of omniscience, we hopelessly compound the error. And then almost the only way we can make our lives still much more difficult is to combine the assumption that *we are always right* with the insistence that *they never are.*

It is not the purpose here to argue the rights and wrongs of various current issues in the Cold War. In this context, it is not so important to show who is right and who is wrong on particular issues as it is to describe a sane attitude about the apportionment of morality. Neither we nor the Western World as a unit has a moral monopoly. And even if we believed that we alone were moral, it would be very bad politics to claim it. The effects of morality in international politics — even if one accepts some definition of absolute morality — are not confined to what *is* moral, but to what the various participants *accept* as moral.

This being true, it is essential that the American people ask whether the Communists qualify as "moral" either on an absolute or a "sliding"

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scale. It is a crucial question. *For if we are not willing to believe that the Communists are capable of moral action, we make that very course available to them as a high premium weapon.* We have too long a history of underestimating Communist capabilities not to be concerned with this possibility.

No doubt it will be difficult to market this idea on the current American scene. We are so accustomed to assigning the ogre's role to the Communists (and they to us) that we are unprepared to approve anything they do or say. Such atrocities as were committed in Hungary in 1956-57, and such perversions of human existence as seem to be embodied in the establishment of the Chinese communes, understandably reinforce this image. One can be forgiven if one concludes from these and a long history of other atrocious activities that there is something basically immoral about communism. There is. But this is an incomplete conclusion. It does not recognize two important possibilities: that reform is possible; and that others (however wrong they may be) disagree with our moral analysis. The latter can perhaps be dismissed as having implications for political tactics but not affecting our own moral judgment. The former requires more discussion.

If some of the individual human beings who call themselves Communists really have reformed (as Khrushchev claims to have improved over Stalin by eliminating the "force and violence" doctrine), it is clearly a "good" thing. We may object to its being called "communism" after it drops certain of its most objectionable characteristics, but we have no control over the flexibility of popular definitions. Considerable change could take place in the *practice* with no change in the *label*. Not only is this preferable to stagnation; we can even read it as a sign of our success. Could we possibly want anything more than for communism to undergo a moral transformation? And if we deny that it is possible, are we not denying that one of our own major goals is possible?

For us to deny that moral reform is possible in China and in the Soviet Union would be for us to confirm the myth of Communist infallibility and to deny the possibility that we might succeed in one of our own major goals. The moral reform of communism is something we should not only believe possible, but as something we have been working to achieve for at least forty years.

As long as we hold to the position that communism is invariably evil and incapable of reform, the Soviet international political position gains artificial strength. We cannot fail to be honored when we oppose a massacre in Hungary or the destruction of the family in China, but we can gain neither favor nor stature abroad when we dismiss as immoral the improvement of living standards for nearly one-fourth of the world's population or the advancement of science by the conquest of outer space. We may impulsively oppose slavery, murder, torture and the other forms of human deprivation which have been associated with communism. But we are ill-advised to insist that our opposition, our persuasion, our patience, our power and the uncommunistic facts of human existence can never succeed in stimulating the growth of a "moral" communism. If we do so, we will dissociate ourselves from the very victory we are trying to achieve.

NONE of these four recommendations for changes in our approach to international politics has suggested a direct answer to the practical problems of Senator Jackson with which we began. Yet each of them describes a change of attitude which would contribute to our ability to solve not only those problems, but the many others which block the road away from a perilous Cold War. Surely if we grant full freedom to the liberal creativeness which has always been a major source of our strength, we can think of something else to do with the soldiers who clean the guns at Fort Lewis.

NEEDED:

An End to Bipartisanship . . *by Cecil V. Crabb, Jr.*

THE OBSERVER who has been apprehensive over recurrent symptoms of hardening of the nation's diplomatic arteries will seek its cause in a variety of sources. Not the least of these is indiscriminate reliance upon the principle of bipartisanship in foreign policy and widespread failure to assess the consequences of this reliance under differing circumstances at home and abroad.

If uncritical attachment to the bipartisan principle is not the *only* factor responsible for the stagnation evident in American foreign policy over the recent past, it has assuredly been a major factor. To assess its implications, and to relate these in turn to the nation's diplomatic behavior, brief attention must be paid to the rationale invoked in its behalf. Unity must (and usually does) prevail on the home front in time of war; therefore, so runs the argument, it ought also to prevail in time of peace, most especially when events have shown that the kind of peace we can expect is a state of quasi-conflict, popularly designated "Cold War." The argument possesses sufficient plausibility so that individuals who question hallowed shibboleths like "Politics stops at the water's edge" are likely to be regarded as deficient in patriotism or, at a minimum, as naively indifferent to the peculiar obstacles confronting a democracy when it is challenged by a totalitarian opponent.

Advocates of bipartisanship can point to instance after instance in American history when internal dissension seriously interfered with the successful formulation and execution of foreign policy. Classic examples are Wilson's internecine fight with Senate Republicans over the League of Nations and FDR's running battle with Congressional isolationists during the 1930s. Admittedly, the *opportunities* for disunity within the government and throughout the country at large have not diminished in the intervening years. The Amer-

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ican Government continues to operate upon a Constitutional doctrine of "separation of powers," giving the President and Congress prerogatives (though of course not *equal* prerogatives) in foreign relations. The extreme decentralization of the American political system renders any concept of "party responsibility" for the management of governmental affairs all but impossible. Moreover, at no time in history have there existed more numerous and effective avenues for vocal pressure groups and individuals to influence deliberations over foreign policy.

AGAINST THIS background, advocates of bipartisanship argue that both the opportunities for producing *disunity* and the urgency of achieving *unity* toward foreign-policy issues are unsurpassed. The overriding goal, therefore, as Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg once phrased it, is to "strive for an unpartisan American foreign policy — not Republican, not Democratic, but American — which substantially unites our people at the water's edge in behalf of peace. . . ." It is a goal with which, when stated as an abstract principle, it is difficult to take issue. Furthermore, postwar experience has shown that it is attainable. Here are a few of the most important instances in which foreign-policy measures have been approached on a bipartisan basis: drafting the U.N. Charter; formulating the Marshall Plan, the China aid bill of 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (superseded eventually by the Mutual Security Program); resisting Communist penetrations during the Berlin blockade and the Korean War; extending the reciprocal trade program; maintaining American participation in the U.N. and in disarmament negotiations. That a bipartisan approach has made a contribution, in a few cases an *indispensable* contribution, to achieving the nation's diplomatic goals must be admitted.

Closer scrutiny, however, would show that in those cases where the bipartisan principle has been most constructively applied, conditions were peculiarly favorable. As a generalization, it may be said that bipartisanship has emerged strongest under conditions most closely paralleling those of war. (Inasmuch as the case for bipartisanship substantially rests upon an analogy with national unity during time of war, this is logical enough.) Conversely, when attempts at bipartisan cooperation have been manifestly unsuccessful, recent experience has shown that the explanation lies in large measure in the absence of conditions normally present in war time.

What are these conditions? Why will they likely determine whether the consequences of relying upon a bipartisan approach are, on balance, advantageous or detrimental to the foreign-policy process at home and to the nation's long-term diplomatic interests?

FOR insight into this problem, let us look more closely at two examples — the Marshall Plan in 1948 and the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 — which not only typify a bipartisan approach under radically differing circumstances, but also symbolize a profound transformation in America's relationship with the outside world.

The impetus for the Marshall Plan arose out of the Truman Administration's mounting apprehension over the economic deterioration evident throughout Western Europe in the immediate postwar period. By 1947 it had become undeniably apparent that unless massive American aid was forthcoming, Europe's worsening condition would trigger widespread political instability. This in turn could provide a fertile environment for greater influence by indigenous Communist groups and would make the North Atlantic area increasingly vulnerable to a possible military thrust across the Iron Curtain.

Accordingly, in an epochal address at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall publicly committed the United States to a long-range, massive program of aid to Western Europe. Nearly a year was required to work out the details. These efforts proceeded on two levels: through negotiations initially conducted among the European recipient countries, with the United States later joining these talks; and through exhaustive bipartisan consultations and studies within the United States. Our interest centers on the latter.

The dominant fact about bipartisanship toward the Marshall Plan was that from the beginning, *bipartisan cooperation in formulating it entailed consultations between spokesmen for the Truman Administration and leaders of a Republican-controlled Congress for the purpose of translating an imaginative Executive idea into a workable program.* The long-range implications of this fact cannot be overemphasized. Bipartisanship in this instance afforded Executive and legislative officials an opportunity to do what both were best suited to do under the American politico-governmental system. The President and his advisers supplied the initiative; and during the months required for the formulation of a finished program, they maintained the leadership necessary to steer the plan successfully through the legislative mill. The Republican opposition in Congress furnished suggestions, criticisms and refinements, many of which grew out of thorough bipartisan studies of selected phases of the Marshall Plan. Moreover, by the spring of 1948, influential Republican figures in Congress had lined up sufficient support among members of their party to assure the required legislative authorization and funds needed for the Marshall Plan's implementation. Solid majorities in both parties closed ranks to produce a program generally conceded to rank high on a list of achievements known to modern diplomacy.

Toward the Marshall Plan, in other words, bipartisan procedures operated within the traditional Constitutional framework; i.e., that the *initiative* in foreign affairs rests with the President and his advisers, and the role of an opposition party under a bipartisan approach must be confined to offering suggestions and alternatives within policy guide lines established by the Executive.

Conditions surrounding formulation of the Marshall Plan were therefore, in many respects, remarkably parallel to those existing in time of war. What analogies are suggested? First, there was an evident threat to

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national security, awareness of which came first to the Executive Branch and eventually to Congress and the country at large. Second, having accepted the existence of a threat, the identification of its nature—Europe's impending descent into the economic (perhaps political) abyss — and of its consequences for the nation was forthcoming from the Executive. Third, an effective strategy for coping with the threat was decided upon by the administration. Finally, possessed of a clear conception of the issue and a carefully thought-out plan of action for dealing with it, the administration invited the Republican opposition in Congress to join in formulating a cohesive, long-term program on a bipartisan basis.

THIS episode contrasts sharply with that occurring ten years later, when the Eisenhower Administration found itself confronted with deepening crises in the Middle East. In response to these crises, it eventually formulated the Eisenhower Doctrine, which it asked the Democratic (majority) opposition in Congress to support.

Judged merely by the end result achieved — impressive majorities in both parties supporting the policy advocated by the President — the outcome in the case of the Marshall Plan and the Eisenhower Doctrine was identical. So nearly did the latter case appear to be a reasonable facsimile of the former, that the Eisenhower Administration could retort to its critics throughout succeeding months that its policies enjoyed firm bipartisan approval.

But superficial appearances could not have been more deceptive; nor could the consequences in the two cases have been more radically dissimilar. The Marshall Plan stands as the epitome of enlightened American statesmanship; the Eisenhower Doctrine, of diplomatic sterility. The former signified dynamic American leadership in the quest for world peace and security; the latter a condition of seemingly chronic diplomatic enfeeblement, accompanied by a pervading sense of self-delusion among Executive policy-makers about the nation's fortunes in external affairs. In short, the two cases illustrated the difference between *shaping* events and *being overcome* by them.

What factors accounted for these differences? Virtually all the elements which coalesced to give birth to an outstandingly successful bipartisan result in 1947-48 were lacking in 1957. At the time of the Eisenhower Doctrine, despite surface resemblances, there was in reality no parallel with key factors present during time of war, which we have identified as being crucial to the outcome of bipartisan ventures.

The measure emerged as the Eisenhower Administration's long-delayed "solution" to a series of progressively more urgent problems affecting American diplomatic interests in the Middle East, climaxed by the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in the fall of 1956. The invasion had been an act of desperation, brought on as much as anything else by a feeling of hopelessness on the part of America's allies that Washington could be induced to exercise leadership in the Middle East. Toward issue after issue — the long smoldering Arab-Israeli conflict; colonial strife in North Africa, Jordan and Cyprus; the problem of Middle Eastern defense, culminating in the provocative "northern tier" defense system; the steady accretion in Communist influence throughout the area, as typified by Egypt's acquisition of arms from Iron Curtain countries and her gravitation toward the Communist orbit in economic affairs; Nasser's grandiose ambitions and interventions —toward all these tense issues, the outstanding feature of the Eisenhower-Dulles response had been intense moralizing on the level of talk and mounting frustration and bewilderment on the level of policy. At least in foreign affairs, Eisenhower's "middle-of-the-road" philosophy seemed to produce a curious blend of diplomatic *rigor mortis* and emotionally-dictated paroxysms, like Dulles' precipitate withdrawal of aid to Egypt for financing the Aswan Dam. Republican orators seemed far more interested in proving they could have saved Chiang Kai-shek than they were in prodding the Eisenhower

Mauldin in St. Louis Post-Dispatch

"Let's face it — we're surrounded by Democrats and Eisenhower Republicans."

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Administration to salvage the West's interests in the Middle East regions.

Long after the allies and critics of the Administration at home had all but abandoned hope that Eisenhower and Dulles were capable of providing the required leadership, the President on January 5, 1957, addressed a joint session of Congress on the Middle East crisis. After reviewing recent events, the President stated frankly that "I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the Congress." Apprehensive over "weaknesses in the present situation and the increased danger from international communism," Eisenhower was convinced of the necessity for "joint action by the Congress and the Executive."

The President's proposal contained pledges to extend greater economic and military assistance to Middle Eastern countries, partially by the diversion of Mutual Security funds already appropriated for other projects. The heart of the Eisenhower Doctrine, however, was the President's request for legislative authorization for "employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations from any nation controlled by international communism." In what surely will qualify as the understatement of recent history, the President conceded that "This program will not solve all the problems of the Middle East." Referring to other critical issues in the area (such as the Arab-Israeli dispute and the problem of the displaced Arab refugees), the President assured Congress that "I propose to deal directly with these problems." Eisenhower concluded his message with the solemn intonation that "In those momentous periods of the past, the President and the Congress have united, without partisanship, to serve the vital interests of the United States and of the free world."

Among members of the Democratic majority in Congress, the initial reaction to the speech was decidedly cool. Many Democrats appeared favorably enough disposed toward the plan, particularly as it might herald at least the *beginning* of a fresh approach in what had long been stagnant American policy toward the Middle East. Moreover, Democrats themselves had been pointing to the marked increase in Communist influence throughout the region, so that few of them were in a position to challenge that aspect of the President's assessment.

NEVERTHELESS, many Democrats were initially skeptical about the efficacy of the Eisenhower Doctrine; and as the months passed the number of critics, and the degree of their skepticism, mounted. Doubts arose from several sources. First, it was feared that, in the light of the doctrine's preoccupation with the Communist menace, the President's program was merely tangential to the really bedrock causes of tension in the Middle East—the Arab-Israeli dispute, colonial conflicts, inter-Arab rivalries and Nasser's imperialistic pretensions. Looked at in the most optimistic sense, the doctrine's value was likely to be heavily determined by the President's subsequent resolution in carrying through with his pledge to bring forth policies dealing constructively with these cardinal issues. And, basing their prediction upon the Administration's performance over the past four years, critics were not sanguine that such pledges would be followed up vigorously. Only the future would tell whether Eisenhower and Dulles were prepared to expend as much energy in *fire prevention* in the Middle East as they had recently demonstrated in extinguishing blazes ignited by Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal, when their energetic fire-fighting had come dangerously close to drowning the Western alliance under a flood of piety and injured American pride.

But these reservations were relatively insignificant compared to another which, both in its direct application to Middle East policy and in its broader implications for American foreign relations as a whole, was fraught with the gravest and most far-reaching consequences. Towering above all the other characteristics of bipartisanship as exemplified in the Eisenhower Doctrine was the fact that, irrespective of the merits of the proposal, *the opposition party had no choice but to support the Eisenhower-Dulles policies at this time and over the course of succeeding months.* Democrats, as William S. White had phrased it apocryphally at the time of the Formosa Resolution in 1955, had been "tied to the President's . . . policy with bonds as gossamer as the moonlight but as effective as steel."

Therein lay a crucial distinction between bipartisanship as it had developed toward the Marshall Plan and toward the Eisenhower Doctrine. And in some measure at least, therein lay the difference also between the undeniably successful results achieved by the Marshall Plan and the meager results achieved to date with the Eisenhower Doctrine. In the former case, as in time of war, Executive policy-makers had arrived at a realistic evaluation of the problem before the country and had produced at least the broad outlines of a strategy designed to deal with it. Bipartisan procedures had been utilized to refine this strategy and to evolve the details of a concrete program embodying the suggestions made by spokesmen for both parties.

RESPECTING the Eisenhower Doctrine, however, bipartisanship consisted essentially of the President's asking the Democratic-controlled Congress to give him *carte blanche* to take a series of as yet largely unspecified steps, at some indefinite time in the future, to deal with what informed students of Middle Eastern affairs regarded as the distinctly secondary Communist threat to the area—all under the guise that the Administration was finally prepared to come to grips with the *real* sources of instability throughout the Arab world and, that to do this successfully, it was imperative to put the nation's foreign policy on a "bipartisan" basis.

That legislative sanction for Eisenhower's proposal would eventually be forthcoming was guaranteed by two considerations. In the first place, in view of the President's dramatic appearance before a joint session of Congress (suggesting procedure resorted to in time of war), Democrats could not afford the incalculable risks involved in repudiating the Chief Executive's leadership in the eyes of the world. Under the Constitution, an opposition party in

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Congress possesses neither the authority nor the means for wresting the control of foreign relations from the President's hands.

In the second place, no matter how wide of the mark they may have felt the Eisenhower Doctrine to be, the President's public identification of "international communism" as the overriding danger placed Democrats in an excruciating dilemma. Many Democrats knowledgeable about foreign policy sharply disagreed with the Eisenhower-Dulles fixation with "international communism"; yet they could not directly challenge that fixation without making the Democratic Party more vulnerable than ever to the Republican accusation that it was soft on communism. The upshot was that, in spite of prolonged legislative study and debate, Eisenhower received substantially the bipartisan endorsement he asked for.

Events over the months that followed showed that the Eisenhower Doctrine had involved an almost total perversion of the bipartisan principle. For time revealed that, as crisis piled on crisis in the Middle East, the doctrine was but another all-too-familiar example of a slogan masquerading as a foreign policy. Toward root problems in the Middle East, the Eisenhower Administration remained as insensitive and lethargic as ever. Israel still found herself surrounded by hostile Arab states whose leaders talked incessantly of a "second round" to drive her into the Mediterranean. Nasser's intrigues, if anything, became more glaring and dangerous. Colonial conflicts raged unchecked. Syria and Iraq gravitated closer than ever to the Communist orbit. Daily it became more evident that the Baghdad Pact was built upon sand.

Recent crises in Iraq and Lebanon have shown that the Eisenhower-Dulles team has lost none of its skill at fire-fighting. But it also showed that neither the Eisenhower Doctrine itself nor other promised new departures in American Middle Eastern policy have made any significant impression in eliminating fire hazards throughout this area. Yet after 1957, Democrats who were heard to complain about the sterility which appeared endemic in the Eisenhower Administration's diplomacy were pointedly reminded that the nation's policies toward that area rested on firm bipartisan foundations!

IN THE American politico-governmental system, the opposition party (even when it controls Congress) cannot usurp the President's role at the helm of the ship of state. What it can do, and has done in every instance of constructive bipartisan cooperation in the recent period, is to work *with* Executive officials to hammer out the best possible poli-

(*Continued on Page 167*)

NEEDED:

The Voice of the People . . *by Stewart Meacham*

A PEACE MOVEMENT has been coming to life in America. Without organization, without money and without a big stable of prestige names, a moral impulse is giving birth to a new political reality.

This is a time of conformity. The ideas of the Cold War which underlie the pronouncements of government have been faithfully echoed for more than a decade by the churches, the business and professional organizations, the labor unions, the newspapers and most of the other opinion-making powers. Dissent has been largely smothered. Nevertheless, the developing peace movement has already demonstrated its ability to challenge the assumption and the practices of the Cold War—and survive. In an age of political orthodoxy, institutional morality and corporate control, individuals are trying to speak out and be heard. This precisely is the most significant single fact about the developing peace movement. A few examples:

In the fall of 1957, a few friends over a weekend on Long Island began talking about sailing out in a small boat to challenge the right of the Government to set off nuclear-bomb tests. A few months later two of them, joined by three others, actually were out in the Pacific and the saga of the *Golden Rule* was being told around the world.

A few months earlier, citizens alarmed by knowledge of the hazards of the nuclear tests and weary of the frustrations of the Cold War, had begun to form neighborhood groups in widely separated communities across the country—in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Denver and a score of other places. At first they did not even know of each other's existence. When the first public declaration of the newly formed National Committee For a Sane Nuclear Policy was published, it found itself with a ready-made following. An early question facing the National Committee was whether it should be a grass-roots membership organization or a small prestige group issuing periodic pronouncements. It quickly learned that it had very little choice. Literally scores of groups across the country began calling themselves by the name which the National Committee had adopted, and they besieged it for leadership and action. Whether it had intended to be or not, the National Committee found itself the leader of a grass-roots movement.

Meanwhile, projects of various kinds began cropping up all over the place. In April, 1958, a small group calling itself Walk For Peace organized a two-pronged walk to New York from New Haven and Philadelphia. The plan was for the two columns to arrive at the headquarters of the United Nations on Good Friday, bearing petitions urging a halt to nuclear tests and an end to the arms race. What started out as a small demonstration by a few pacifists mushroomed. A third column marched from Long Island. The three columns converged in upper Manhattan carrying banners and petitions and when they came down Broadway on Good Friday morning a line which it had been hoped might total as many as 200 persons had swelled to more than a thousand.

Later, "walks" were organized to

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

The Observer (London)

Washington. Demonstrations against nuclear tests and missile bases occurred. No one was too obscure to do something. A woman in Los Angeles started a "one man" chain-letter project which she calls "letters to leaders," urging a halt to the arms race. A couple in Houston, Texas, send regular "peace" mailings to several hundred friends. A man in Tempe, Arizona, has published a series of full-page advertisements against nuclear war. A housewife in Cheyenne, the Catholic mother of four young children, had never dreamed that she would ever picket anything until the day when the high brass arrived from Washington to dedicate the ICBM missile site there. That afternoon she walked up and down, all alone, at the dedication ceremonies with a crudely lettered sign which said, "Missiles will not bring peace."

GOVERNMENT reaction to all this has varied. When demonstrators invaded Camp Mercury in Nevada in the summer of 1957, they were treated gently by the authorities. After arrests, they were given speedy trials and suspended sentences and sent on their way. The *Golden Rule* was more awkward for the Government. After all, freedom of the seas is a traditional right which our own Navy has fought to preserve; to declare thousands of square miles of the South Pacific "off limits" to world shipping requires a highly relaxed approach to the principles of international law as well as to concepts of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, the AEC ground out a special administrative order to provide a legal base for intercepting the *Golden Rule*, and when the little crew persisted in the voyage, the Department of Justice, the U. S. Coast Guard and the U. S. District Court in Honolulu all swung into line and packed the voyagers into prison.

At Cheyenne, demonstrators at the missile base under construction there were first ignored by the local police and the military guards, who stood by watching but made no arrests as the demonstrators tried to block the site gate. The truck drivers manhandled them out of the way and drove on through. Only after one of the pickets was smashed by a truck was the picketing broken up and the leaders arrested and given jail sentences.

In New York in May, 1958, the annual air-raid drill was challenged by pickets who were arrested and tried, receiving thirty-day suspended sentences. A few days later a group called on Admiral Lewis Strauss, then head of the AEC, at his Bethesda, Maryland, headquarters. They wanted to talk with him about the jailing of the crew of the *Golden Rule*. The Admiral had other concerns at the moment and was "not in," but he changed his mind after they had sat in his waiting room for eight days and nights.

When petitions containing over 50,000 signatures against nuclear-weapons tests were taken to the White House in early 1958, no one would receive them. The petitioners were told to leave them with the guards at the gate. Only after complaint had brought inquiries from members of the Congress did a Presidential assistant become available to receive the petitions and voice the appropriate assurances that attention would be given to them.

THAT THE Administration is no longer in a position to ignore what is going on among the people is suggested by the November elections. Two Congressmen won on strong peace platforms in districts which traditionally had been considered safe for the opposing party. Despite a general timidity on the part of most Democratic stalwarts to challenge the Administration on foreign policy (there were notable exceptions), a strong negative vote was registered which was widely interpreted as being due, at least in part, to growing concern over such recurring crises as those in Lebanon and the Formosa Straits.

Foreign policy seems about to become at last a subject of open debate. Last October, a group of citizens published a strongly worded statement in *The New York Times* and other newspapers, sharply critical of what they called a "policy of Cold War." Several weeks later, a study group of the National Council of Churches, meeting in Cleveland and drawing hundreds of delegates from all over the country, called for recognition of Red China and advocated her admittance to the United Nations. This has now been echoed in an appeal to the new Congress by the same citizens' group which published the October statement. And so it goes.

How is this movement to be understood? Have the moral and ethical ideas of the pacifists suddenly won a wider following? Probably not, though pacifists would like to think so. What is happening is more complex. There is wider acceptance of pacifist leaders, but this does not mean a necessary acceptance of pacifist ideas. Pacifists have won respect among non-pacifists for two principal reasons: (1) they have stood by their unorthodox convictions

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through the lean years when nearly everyone else was toeing the Cold War line; and, (2) the political relevance of pacifist ideas has been tested in the Montgomery, Alabama, bus protest with results which have impressed the most skeptical.

IT HAS become clear that moral response to the present situation requires something more than withdrawal. The cancer of violence has so permeated the structure of our life that no one can live in our society and be free of responsibility for war. Even though we refuse military service, decline to pay taxes and reject employment in munitions plants, we yet remain parts of the social and economic situation which makes for war. Even if it were possible to withdraw entirely, it is doubtful that it would be politically effective or morally valid to do so.

Demonstrations against nuclear tests, conscientious disobedience of government requirements supporting war, vocational discrimination based on issues of war and peace—all are essential. But all demonstrators, all conscientious objectors, all tax refusers, all civil disobeyers need to walk humbly and with a sense of their own involvement in the very evil they oppose. Their goal is not a private bath, but a new community.

Pacifists are not the only ones who fall into the error and the irresponsibility of imagining that purity and non-involvement are aspects of virtue. There are scientists who believe they can burrow into their laboratories and leave the politics of their work to the politicians. But the truth is that the very politicians who demand that scientists be non-political are themselves unwilling to assume responsibility for the scientific products which they want the scientists to turn over to them. Congress has the duty to ask questions, but it looked the other way when the Marines were landed in Lebanon. It has the responsibility to pass on declarations of war, but it acquiesces in arrangements which allow wars to be started without formal declarations and without reference to the mind of the Congress. It has the power and the responsibility of the purse strings, but on matters of war and peace it does as it is told and if it displays any independence at all it is to insist on giving more money than is asked to the very agencies which are most deeply wrapped in Cold War layers of fiscal obscurity.

The state of the Executive is no better. The foreign policy of the United States appears to be worked out between a President who must be briefed on everything, and a Secretary of State who feels no need to be briefed on anything. In the absence of wide popular concern, the power of decision atrophies at the upper levels of power as well as among the people. Even the crucial power to decide whether to launch all-out push-button war is without clear identification or definition. No one is quite able to say just who will push the button. The best guess seems to be that it will be some obscure lieutenant or captain relying on the ambiguous evidence presented on a radar screen which cannot clearly distinguish an oncoming missile attack from a shower of meteors.

A scientist who imagines that he can divest himself of moral responsibility outside his laboratory for what goes on inside it, or that he can exercise his responsibility by proxy, has far less respect for the facts of life than he has for the facts of his science.

THE morality of peace is the morality of involvement and it is this morality which is creating a new coalition of pacifists and non-pacifists. Past coalitions between them have been short-lived.

It may be that this present coalition will also fall apart, but here are reasons to believe otherwise:

1. *There is a new dimension to disillusionment with war.*

War has been terrible, scarcely supportable and strangely indecisive for more than a century. But until the discovery of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, acceptance of it as a last resort was still conceivable. Today the arms race makes sense only on one of two assumptions: (a) that resort to total war will come only under circumstances which make mutual genocide preferable to survival, or (b) that limited war will *never* become unlimited. The first assumption is advanced by some current spokesmen, but if the suicide rates on both sides of the Iron Curtain are any guide, most people just do not agree. They prefer life to death.

The second assumption is not any more attractive than the first. The champions of limited war argue that war *can* be limited. But that is not the question. The question is whether it can be *guaranteed* that any *particular* limited war will not become unlimited. Unless there is such a guarantee, every limited war *may* become unlimited, and this is a risk which mankind cannot accept.

The advocates of limited war do not deny that limited war *may* sweep beyond the limits. In other words, they really advocate defense strategy based on the possibility of mass suicide, which leaves us right back where we were with the first assumption.

Realization that war is no longer available as an instrument of foreign policy to a responsible government is a stabilizing factor in the development of a peace coalition. Those who come in because of this realization scarcely can be led elsewhere by events, for events are not likely to change this basic fact.

2. *There is a new willingness among pacifists to accept political responsibility.*

Reinhold Niebuhr's strictures against pacifist irresponsibility have bitten deep. The logical folly of nuclear defense, and the effectiveness of non-violent strategies both in India and in Alabama, have led many pacifists to realize that their beliefs have political relevance. They welcome coalition with non-pacifists as necessary, for they want to test out the pacifist ethic in the political crises of the time; and they know that the only way to do it is to relate their ethics to actual situations and see whether that which they are moved to undertake for reasons of conscience may not also be persuasive for reasons of prudence. They believe that it will be so, and they find the prospect exhilarating.

3. *The peace movement meets an inner need of people.*

The rationalization of industrial

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work, the subordination of personality to the machine, the application of scientific methods to personality control, the use of persons as means of production, the evaluation of persons in terms of productivity, the emphasis on economic rather than creative production—all these combine to alienate the individual and lie back of much of the personal instability of our time.

People are bored with their work and they are humiliated by the fact that their worth is measured by their role in a production or commercial process which has little real meaning. Vast areas of their life are uncommitted because they are unrequired. Narrow areas of life are completely committed to processes and institutions which have no rightful claim either to their affection or their respect.

One of Boris Pasternak's characters in *Dr. Zhivago* says that untruth came in Russia when "people imagined that it was out of date to follow their own moral senses," and that "the main misfortune, the root of all the evil to come, was the loss of confidence in the value of one's own opinion." There is less difference between what the conditions of modern productivity do to personality on the opposite sides of the Iron Curtain than the cold warriors of either side would want to admit.

THE REASON that there is a new kind of peace movement today is not so much that people are frightened by the threat of nuclear destruction as that they are terrified at being lost as people. The deepest problem we face is not to escape physical destruction, but to regain a sense of the meaning and worth of our lives. The peace movement will achieve power only as it helps restore us to ourselves.

C. Wright Mills, in his recent book, *The Causes of World War III*, calls for "demands upon men of power . . . to hold them specifically responsible for specific courses of events." This is no slight task. To do it requires that at least a few be totally committed.

The drive for racial justice in the South is not powered by the NAACP, the Constitution, nor even by the Supreme Court. Each of these is important, but none of them could do the essential thing which is *to raise the issue and to keep it raised.* This has been done by the heroic and the obscure. The peace movement must come in the same way. The moral issue must be raised among the people. It is immoral to organize people to wipe themselves out. It is immoral to tamper with the genetic stuff of our lives. It is immoral to accept being silenced. A religion, a theology, an ideology, a culture, a national destiny or a class ambition which requires the preparation and use of weapons of mass destruction for its survival, is no longer worthy of survival and should be abandoned.

If it is true that the whole development of mankind has been marked by a biological struggle for survival, we may expect that the realization soon will register that survival and peace are synonymous. For this realization to become dominant in the species it is necessary that there be more than mere acquiescence to an idea. Peace and the relationships of peace in the whole life of society must receive the support of ethics and politics in a movement of the people.

All of the concerned, and that means all of the people who have a sense of the situation, must make the idea of peace a part of their lives in terms of specific acts. Where there are no community groups speaking out against nuclear weapons, they should be formed. Where newspapers are not raising the issue of the Cold War, statements should be drafted and published. Where missile bases are being located without reference to public consideration and consent, discussion should be precipitated. Where public protest is met with arrests, then more protesters should take the places of those jailed.

The men of power can be held responsible only by those who accept moral responsibility for themselves and for their society. How to give specific expression to this depends on the situation. But actually getting down to it is, at once, a condition of social survival and a response to man's deepest questions about the meaning of his life in the space age.

NEEDED:

A Purge of Obsessions . . *by D. F. Fleming*

ROOSEVELT had labored long to end World War II in partnership with the Soviet Union, to make the peace in cooperation with her and to maintain it with her as an equal in the new United Nations. At the time of his death nothing could have been a greater affront to sanity than another arms race—the third in an average lifetime. Yet eleven days later —on April 23, 1945—came President Truman's famous castigation of Foreign Minister Molotov, abruptly reversing our ship of state. Ever since, we have been set on a course of Cold War—first with the Soviet Union and communism, and now also with China.

In spite of our current effort to locate the declaration of that epic conflict in Stalin's election speech of February 9, 1946, the struggle was not formally joined until Churchill's Fulton, Missouri, speech of March 5, 1946, the Truman Doctrine address of March 12, 1947, and George Kennan's containment thesis of July, 1947. These events fully committed us to the armed containment of the Soviet Union and communism.

Today the published figures speak of 900 American armed stations overseas, of 400 NATO bases near the Soviet Union, of $15 billion in arms to NATO, of $600 million for bases in Spain. Maps showing our air bases all around the giant rim of Eurasia have become too commonplace to attract attention. Even the half-dozen little countries around China are so heavily loaded down with our arms that their economies stagger and their liberties flicker.

This giant encirclement ring has been formalized in a maze of alli-

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ances which include forty-four other countries. After firmly rejecting the League of Nations as an "entangling alliance," we are today so truly entangled in some alliances—i.e., with the Chinese Nationalists—that we do not know how to escape from them.

IN OTHER words, we have swung all the way over from the extreme isolation of the twenties to total involvement—as complete an overcompensation as a nation could make. Later generations, if there are any, will wonder why the pendulum swung so far, and they will hardly solve the puzzle without considering the following factors:

1. *Our refusal to comprehend the traumatic need of the Soviet peoples for military security in East Europe.*

Since 1913, the Russians have been invaded disastrously through this region—not once but *three* times (including the great Western interventions of 1918-1920). In each case the ravages were frightful, ending in the almost total devastation of much of the Soviet Union west of the Urals by 1945. In these three tragedies—all in one average lifetime—some 30 million Russians were killed, scores of millions were deprived of shelter, many billions in capital wealth vanished, and a great nation received mental scars so deep that a century could hardly erase them.

If the United States had been invaded disastrously through Mexico only *once*, there can be no doubt about what our attitude toward that country would be. Yet, in 1945 we expected the Soviet armies to retire from East Europe, leaving anti-Soviet ruling elements free to organize the area through "free elections"—though, except for Czechoslovakia, a free election had rarely occurred in that area.

2. *President Truman's determination to forbid any Soviet gains in the Mediterranean or the Middle East after World War II, a policy continued adamantly by Mr. Dulles.*

This was traditional British policy and it had worked against a weak, agricultural Czarist Russia. The permanent Russian urge to control some access to the warm oceans had always been frustrated. But, weak as the USSR was in 1945, she had achieved an industrial structure which had enabled her to meet and hurl back the mightiest armies ever assembled on this planet. It was highly unlikely that this Soviet Union could be forever hemmed in on her southern frontier—even though it seemed natural to us that the West should retain total control of the area's vast oil resources.

3. *Our resolution, after the Korean War, to keep control of the entire Pacific Ocean up to China's harbors, and of the fringes of East Asia.*

This development was a natural outgrowth of the Truman Doctrine, and it put us in the business of containing two great Red powers on their own home grounds. It had also the fatal defect of extending our commitments outside of our own community. In a thoughtful address to a National Council of Churches conference on November 20, 1958, Thomas K. Finletter pointed out that NATO "is a military confederation organized by the members of Western society for the defense of their own society against attack from without—a legitimate move of self defense. But when we extruded Western military power into Asia and Africa, this was very different." It was "precisely the definition of colonialism and is therefore a sure way of losing friends and influence in Asia and Africa."

This distinction indicates the extent of the withdrawal we shall eventually be compelled to make—back into our own Western society, which includes Western Europe, this hemisphere and Australasia.

4. *Our post-Roosevelt alliance with reactionary elements and dictators around the world.*

This self-defeating policy was a natural consequence of the containment policy; anyone who is opposed to the Reds is our ally and eligible for big shipments of heavy weapons.

Every reactionary group in the world at once qualified and received arms and generous "defense support." Even Latin America, surely several decades away from Soviet invasion, received the heavy weapons which speedily facilitated a crop of army dictatorships—eight of them—a brutal brood which is fast disappearing, but which our Latin neighbors will long hold against us.

Our alliance with the dying regimes of the past, such as that of General Franco, had a deeper reason. Harvard economist John K. Galbraith last year recalled to the Foreign Policy Association that we once had a Good Neighbor policy which reflected our concern with "people in general, not a privileged few"; we were automatically saved then from "an even-handed policy of distributing aid to tyrants." Then World War II brought our conservatives into power in Washington; and subsequently bipartisan union for the Cold War rapidly turned our foreign aid into military channels, on the basis of three military dollars to one for genuine economic aid.

5. *Our economic penetration into all the non-Communist world.*

This process continued rapidly until last spring, when Latin America erupted in abusive protest against our economic policies as well as our arming of their dictators; and the Canadians discovered that Americans owned the commanding sectors of their economy. They reacted by electing a Government pledged to recovering control of their own economy. When even the Canadians fear us, it is time for us to re-examine our position in the world.

6. *The militarization of our economy.*

Since 1914 our prosperity has been powered by war expenditures, the repairing of the ravages of war abroad, and by preparations for war. Now the Cold War has institutionalized military spending as a main prop of our prosperity. Everyone shudders at any thought of its sudden removal; any prospect of peace gives Wall Street the jitters. Yet no more dangerous way of life has ever been invented than living on the precarious prosperity of an arms race. Is this the best we can do?

To the conglomeration of factors behind the Cold War, one more item must be added—our monopoly of the atomic bomb between 1945 and 1949. The memoirs of both Truman and Churchill show this. It enabled

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the containment doctrine to be conceived with confidence, and military encirclement to be established on the ground. Scientists warned with great anxiety and persistence that our monopoly would be short-lived, but the politicians and generals would not believe them.

Then in 1949, when the Soviets fired their first A-bomb, the decision was not for an immense effort to make peace and stop the deadly arms race, but for making the H-bomb and a policy of "steady nerves." The outcome? The USSR got an H-bomb into the air before we did, though we were the first to explode one on the ground. The Russians also got squadrons of intercontinental jet bombers into the air first, though we had begun work on them in 1946, four years before they began.

These successes were the prelude to their now commanding lead in missiles, both IRBMs and ICBMs, which was described in the *Reporter* of January 8 by one of our ablest military analysts, Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips (Ret.).

WHAT WE have yet to realize is that we will never be able to regain military superiority over the USSR. Neither side can ever win this arms race, but either can touch off the destruction of Western civilization, perhaps accidentally.

In other words, the Cold War has failed to win for us its primary objective: the enforcement of good conduct on "the enemy" by military confinement. The goal seemed feasible when "the enemy" was weak, but containment has had an effect opposite to that intended. It has driven him up from his bed of exhaustion, incurred in our common war, and has forced him through prodigies of recovery, reconstruction, new construction, scientific advance and rearmament, until he has amassed the power to break the ring of encirclement.

Our leaders did not foresee that they would generate the very power which they were seeking to keep in preventive custody. And they forgot that two might play the encirclement game. The result is that the Soviets will soon have the capability of reaching any target in the United States with thousands of ICBMs, supplemented by jet bombers, and from missile-carrying submarines off our four coasts (the fourth being Hudson's Bay, deep in the heart of North America). Have you looked at the map of North America lately?

This, too, is only half the story—perhaps less. We have set out to keep in close confinement the most numerous people on earth — 640 million Chinese, soon to be a billion—the oldest and probably the toughest race on earth. It is credibly reported that last year they nearly doubled their steel output and their food production. What is open to no doubt at all is the immensity of the energies they mobilized. Nor can anyone read the six articles by John Strohm, of Illinois, written last October after his trip through China at the height of the latest Quemoy crisis, without recognizing what a great stimulus to the Chinese has been our military, economic and diplomatic blockade of them.

ANY HARD look at the future should indicate that we need a new foreign policy, one which will strive increasingly to moderate the Cold War and make peace while there is still time. It is an almost incredible fact that though it will soon be fourteen years since Roosevelt died, the peace he and Cordell Hull planned has not yet been made. We still refuse to accept the inescapable consequences of World War II, hoping that if we continue to wear a grim visage they can somehow be reversed. We have turned ourselves from victors into losers, and we are not very likely to retrace our way to accepting the world as it is — revolutionary and on the march — until we discard some of the dogmas and stereotypes of containment, such as the following:

1. *That Stalin was out to conquer the world.*

This was the first analogy upon which the Cold War was founded: a quick transfer of opprobrium from the raging Hitler to the cool and cautious Stalin. The incessant repetition of the Soviet world-conquest theme soon convinced us that it was true. It applied everywhere, but especially to Germany. Since we have long intended to get all of Germany into our armed alliance, we still insist that the USSR means to do the same thing. But is there any firm evidence of such a purpose, at any time since 1945?

2. *That communism is just as bad as fascism, and worse.*

This was the other analogy upon which we built the Cold War, and it is still dangerous to question it. Yet it was always clear that communism had two features which would keep it from being wholly predatory and regressive — universal education and the firm promise of a better standard of living. These factors insure a rapid evolution in the Communist states; and as their wealth develops, they become more conservative and

As the Soviet Union . . .



Toward the West Pacific and Southeast Asia.



Toward Southern Asia and the Indian Ocean.

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more conscious of individual rights.

3. *That the Communists mean to take over the world.*

Some of them do, by proving rapidly that their system works best. The dedicated among them believe it is bound to happen, as many believers in earlier ideologies have believed. They mean to work at it, but they can never succeed against the demonstrated success of our way of life in the West. Mikoyan has just seen for himself that American capitalism works. Our primary problem is to keep our own life healthy and evolving normally.

4. *That if we lose one small position to a Communist state, all is lost everywhere.*

This is the ever-present "domino theory." The Truman Doctrine was founded on it: if Greece went, then Italy, France, the Middle East would go. It has been our main argument in every crisis of the Cold War since. The image was invoked again with great solemnity in the latest Quemoy crisis. It is said that if we lost Formosa, we would lose the entire Pacific. Since we mean to control all of the Pacific, we refuse to accept the idea of a division of power there — though such a division of the world's largest ocean is inevitable.

Nothing can be done toward ending the Cold War while the domino image is sacrosanct. It forbids the elimination of friction points such as Quemoy and Berlin, which are obviously intolerable to our opponents. There are places where geography overrules politics, and if diplomacy will do nothing to remove the sore spots, then we must expect that blockades, barrages and "ultimatums" will keep us always on the brink of the final nuclear war.

Instead of a nuclear war for Berlin, wouldn't it be better to begin the disengagement of rival nuclear armies in Germany?

5. *That we cannot live acceptably or safely without rapid and constant economic growth.*

It is now well known that the Communist economic systems grow faster than ours. This is because central authority holds down consumption and directs labor and materials to building industry, especially heavy industry. The same authority also diverts a part of the growing resources to aiding underdeveloped countries at low interest rates and without asking for property ownership. These factors cause us to say constantly that we must increase our rate of economic growth or perish.

Even more acutely, we fear the spread of communism to any new country, because its capitalist development is thereby automatically ended. We fear the gradual constriction of our economic elbow room. This fear is the economic motive power behind the domino theory. We fear an enforced economic isolation in a too-small capitalist area.

But isn't it time to question the dogma of an eternally accelerating economic growth, especially since we cannot prevent the USSR and China from rapidly becoming economic giants? We have to remain strong economically, yes, but do we have to use up the limited resources of nature at an ever-faster rate? Where does that end? When we already consume 70 per cent of the world's wealth, though we are only 16 per cent of its people, we can afford to moderate our economic desires a little.

All of the peoples of the "free" world are going to insist increasingly on owning their own economies. The governments of the Middle East will soon take over the bonanza profits of our oil operations in their areas. It is already happening in Venezuela. Brazil and Argentina exclude our oil capital, except on a strictly controlled basis. Even Castro's Cuba looks askance at our billion-dollar investment there.

BUT THE industrialization of the nations on an autonomous basis does not mean that we cannot invest widely, in partnership with native investors, and trade with them to our mutual profit. And are we certain that such trade can never cross ideological frontiers? Mikoyan seems eager to trade with us, and China would like to spread her trade.

The Cold War world which we blocked out for ourselves is undoubtedly going to shrink, both politically and economically, but that does not mean that we cannot remain strong and prosperous — if a little

. . . Sees the World:

How five key areas adjacent to the Soviet bloc look to an observer in the Kremlin. (Pro-West areas in black.)



Toward the Middle East and the African continent.

Toward Europe and the Mediterranean Basin.

Toward the Arctic and the North Atlantic Ocean.

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less conspicuously so — and free. None of us wants government to become the sole employer in our country, or to become a thought-controller. Avoiding these things is absolutely vital, but if the Communist method produces a standard of living in the Soviet Union equal to ours, need we therefore go into a decline?

Above all, it is essential that we recover our standing in the eyes of the world as a people which practices freedom at home, full strength; which does not stand on any plateau of assumed social perfection; which grants the right of other peoples to their own systems and their own political evolution; and which helps other nations not for political returns, but because they need it. We can neither prosper nor be happy as the opponent of all the revolutions which are running in the world — Communist, Arab, nationalist, anti-colonial and anti-poverty. We cannot make the world conform to our image, but we have always found that a good example is a powerful magnet.

So, too, have our rivals, whose main threat to us has never been military or subversive. In his new book, *The Communist World and Ours* (Atlantic-Little Brown, $2.00), Walter Lippmann reminds us that "we delude ourselves if we do not realize that the main power of the Communist states lies not in their clandestine activity but in the force of their example." Lippmann's key conclusion is that "what we need is a restrained, unsparing reappraisal of our own habits and reactions."

THE EVIDENCE accumulates that the American people know that the Cold War has failed and that they would like to be led out of it. Public-opinion surveyor Samuel Lubell wrote on September 30, 1958, of "a deep uneasiness, an anxiety over impending disaster, a sense that as a nation we are beset by problems which are slipping beyond our control." This tallied with Senator Fulbright's statement of last August 6: "We should put off no longer a complete reconsideration and reorientation of our foreign policy. We have already waited far too long." And it tallies with Arthur Krock's report last July 15 that many critical observers were asking whether events had not already passed the stage when a great nation must fundamentally revise its foreign policy. They were wondering whether the Truman Mid-East policies and the Eisenhower Doctrine were obsolete. Did not conditions now require us to treat realistically with Communist China and East Germany? And was not "the only effective substitute to these reversals of policy a resort of force" — virtually without allies?

In the same weeks the president of the Royal Bank of Canada returned from China saying that "The growth in industry, the change in living standards, the modernization of everything, the feats of human effort, and the colossal impact of human labor are not within my power to describe"; and Adlai Stevenson came home from Russia conscious of the depth of "the angry hostility of the Chinese leaders toward the United States" and of "the thrust and purpose in most aspects of Soviet life." Yet Chalmers Roberts had to record in the Washington *Post* on September 21 that "it takes only an hour to fly to the United Nations from Washington, but one needs a sort of mental decompression chamber to adjust to the change in atmosphere, it is so great." Washington was still mired in the Cold War.

Then the November election retired dedicated cold warriors from the Congress by the dozen. Most of the reactionary class of 1946 — cold warriors par excellence — was swept away and younger men were elected, who by all accounts are more interested in living in the future than in dragging their heels against the past. These men want to resume the social advance which World War II and the Cold War cut off, and if well led they could put us again in tune with the other peoples of the world.

Can bipartisanship save us? The only bipartisanship that could be constructive hereafter is bipartisan unity to learn to live on this shrinking planet with ideologies which we don't like — and we are not likely to get that kind. [See Cecil V. Crabb's article on page 155 — Ed.]

The Democrats remain under the label "the war party" in the public mind, mainly because of the disastrous Truman-MacArthur decision to abolish the state of North Korea, after they had rescued South Korea in 1950. But nothing compels the Democrats to stay frozen in their Cold War trenches, along with Mr. Truman, when the country desperately needs courageous, sustained leadership in making peace. Many liberal Republicans and independents would also rally to such a policy.

Can we get the essential leadership? Never in our history have we stood in greater need of such leadership in the White House and the State Department. It is, of course, barely conceivable that Mr. Dulles might decide to salvage something of his reputation in history by some steps toward peace in his remaining months. He is now reduced to urging us to have steady nerves — exactly as Acheson once did. Yet it is much easier to get into the encirclement game than to get out of one that has boomeranged. Going in is easy; it enlists all of our combative instincts, our chauvinism, even self-righteousness. The *Wall Street Journal*, last December 3, commented in an editorial on the "hopelessly costly chaos" which has resulted from our having undertaken to give forty-odd nations military help in perpetuity. One result has been that we have "lost our standards for judging what is and is not important for our purposes. And this has seemed to the rest of the world abnormal, the behavior of an irrational nation, not of a nation properly concerned with its own legitimate interests in the world."

THIS IS the kind of irrational involvement from which our next leaders must extricate us. Nor can they succeed without real and sincere understanding of the viewpoints of others, especially of our rivals. Disengagement demands endless patience in negotiations and unflinching determination to see them through. And it involves a never-failing understanding that man's hold upon continued existence on this planet has never been so slender.

The precariousness of our situation compels us to scrutinize the candidates for the Presidential nomina-

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tion in 1960 as we have never done before. We cannot afford to nominate any young man who happens to be able or clever. We must have a man of maturity and wisdom, especially one who understands the urgency of steering our international policies into safer channels. The same considerations apply to the Vice Presidential candidates. When all humanity lives balanced on the knife edge of terror, "balancing" the ticket with a local politician, no matter how popular, will not do.

The policy which is now essential for our future does not involve the surrender of anything which is rightfully ours, but it does demand adjustment with the world which will require character, as well as energy and courage, in our leaders. For example, the London *Observer* suggested on January 18 that it should now be "possible to begin the slow, painful, inconceivably difficult task of constructing some system of disarmament, inspection and control to replace the present international anarchy."

IT SHOULD shock us that we are still living in a state of international anarchy, nearly forty years after Woodrow Wilson's gallant fight to end it! In his time, a few top leaders of the six Great Powers of Europe had schemed and maneuvered and armed against each other through a half-dozen crises, when "the ultimate weapon" was the machine gun. Then there was one crisis too many. Millions died and great governments crashed.

In 1939 it was all to do over again, only many times worse. Now, only a few years later, we are engaged in another balance-of-power and ideological fight and this despite the appalling warning: Hiroshima. We go from brink to brink, rushing our armed forces from one side of the world to the other, from Lebanon to Quemoy — and next to Berlin?

Is the average American helpless to do anything about it? If he will bear in mind that we are late in the push-and-shove cycle of an arms race, when the weapons are H-bombs, ICBMs and missile-carrying submarines, he will be able to think of things. If he will remember that Germany was the center of the first two world conflicts, he will exert his full influence against a third one for her reunification (our style) or for her atomic armament.

The history of the origins of the recent world wars tells us that we are now using up our very last chance. *The Scotsman* rightly warned, on January 22, that "The world has got to come to its senses, not for the benefit of Russia, France, Britain or anyone else, but for survival." The course of the Cold War tells us also that a steady diet of suspicion and fear cannot save us. Only understanding, tolerance and cooperation can do that.

THE HISTORY of the last sixty years warns us that beyond the Cold War lies oblivion. This is not defeatism; it is simply what the record tells us. Ever since 1947, the control and liquidation of the Cold War has been humanity's most critical problem. If this problem can be solved, we will then have a chance to grow gradually into a single world community of diverse maxims and creeds, but one in which men can expect to live fruitfully and die in peace. We have learned that living to frustrate other people's purposes is self-defeating. Now if we will try as hard to work with all men, we will discover that the satisfactions multiply, instead of diminish.

In his impressive Davies Memorial Lecture before a distinguished audience in Washington on January 18, Adlai Stevenson began by quoting these words: "The world is now too dangerous for anything but the truth, too small for anything but brotherhood." No government's foreign policy can succeed which does not move away from hate and conflict and toward unity and brotherhood.

The Cold War had one magnificent by-product — the Marshall Plan; and it may have another — economic aid to India sufficient to enable her to remain democratic. Such by-products must become our main goals. The real struggle in which we are engaged is not in amassing ever more deadly means of destruction, but in holding our own in a race to demonstrate for the world who can "create the good life for the greatest number."

Bipartisanship

(*Continued from Page 159*)

cies obtainable. *The unity that results stems from a genuine conviction that such policies in fact serve the national interest.* Failing this kind of approach, the next best alternative is for the opposition party to revert to its historical function in a democratic system: by enlightened and responsible criticism, to prod the incumbent Administration into coming forth with realistic policies and programs.

Under the kind of forced "bipartisan" mantle which enveloped the Eisenhower Administration's policies toward the Middle East, the Democratic opposition could take *neither* alternative. Confronted with a leadership vacuum in the White House, it waited vainly to collaborate in behalf of a program comparable to the Marshall Plan; nor could it revert to its historic obligation to criticize responsibly — if necessary by appealing to the electorate—because it had already agreed ahead of time to associate itself with whatever policies (or lack of policies) were eventually forthcoming under the doctrine. What the Democratic opposition could not be certain of at the time, but what it learned throughout intervening months, was that *it had sanctified the absence of policy by giving it bipartisan endorsement.* In so doing (and under the pressure of patriotic compulsions it would have been difficult to do otherwise), the Democrats simultaneously gave what amounted to a vote of confidence in the Administration's progressively feeble policies and relinquished what limited power they possessed to make them better.

It would be platitudinous to say that the first prerequisite of a sound *bipartisan* foreign policy is that there should be a *foreign* policy. Yet no other conclusion is possible from an analysis of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The bipartisanship identified with this doctrine does little more than perpetuate diplomatic inertia and eliminate the one effective means — an alert, informed opposition — by which chronic lethargy in the Executive Branch might possibly be overcome.

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BOOKS and the ARTS

The Re-Discovery of Europe

CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIETY. By H. Stuart Hughes. Alfred A. Knopf. 433 pp. $6.

Hans Meyerhoff

IT IS now a slogan that ours is an age of anxious, self-conscious analysis. *Consciousness and Society* gives historical substance to the slogan. It is an intellectual portrait of a generation of European thinkers who, in retrospect, were the advance guard of the unhappy, divided consciousness of modern man. Since it is the first study of its kind in the English-speaking world, and since it is an excellent study, it makes an indispensable contribution, not only to historical research, but to our own thinking of where we are and where we came from. If people are really interested, as they say they are, in understanding some of the basic ideas that have shaped the modern mind, they will read this book.

It deals with the period between 1890 and 1930, "from the *fin de siècle* to the great depression," and presents a cross-section of European thought in France, Germany, Austria and Italy — "Europe in the narrower sense" or what Mr. Hughes also calls "the original 'heartland' of Western society." He has set the stage effectively by assigning his actors to different groups. At the center are the most powerful minds, and still the most impressive figures today: Benedetto Croce and Wilhelm Dilthey in history and philosophy, Sigmund Freud in psychology and Max Weber in sociology. They dominate the scene in *Consciousness and Society*; and the long, thoughtful chapters in which they play their parts make the most exciting reading. On another level we meet a group of men, including Bergson, Durkheim, Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Mannheim and Meinecke, whose contributions, though often noteworthy and original, are now more limited and dated. In addition to these, social thinkers in a technical sense, Mr. Hughes has drawn upon a number of outsiders, especially from the literature of the period — Proust, Gide, Mann, Hesse and Pirandello — in order to show how the confluence of ideas from a variety of sources defines the intellectual identity of a whole generation.

Thus *Consciousness and Society* is intellectual history on a large scale. Mr. Hughes brings to his work a superb knowledge of the European mind, and a rare blend of professional detachment from and elective affinity with his subject matter. He has a special facility for weaving men and ideas into a composite portrait so that both come to life against the background of a rich cultural scene. It is a pleasure to read a study in which scholarship, analysis and literary style combine to achieve a work which is both a highly responsible and a highly enjoyable history of ideas.

IN HISTORY—as in philosophy—it is impossible, and undesirable, to please everybody, especially if one is engaged, as Mr. Hughes is, in writing a comprehensive and genuinely interpretative study. Thus it is only proper that I register a few critical reflections upon a work for which I have the highest respect. It is unfortunate, I think, that he did not make room for Nietzsche as a point of departure for his book. Nietzsche, who went insane in 1890, was discovered only in the first decade of our century and contributed more to the central idea of *Consciousness and Society* than most of the thinkers included in this volume. Again, while Mr. Hughes opens his work with a backward look toward Marx, he does not pursue the subsequent fate of Marxist thought; yet Socialist theory in Germany (and Austro-Hungary) — for example, Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg, or the early Lukács, as well as the theory of Leninism — mark an important phase in the intellectual history of this period. Finally, I regret that Mr. Hughes did not choose to deal more explicitly with the roots and rising tide of romantic totalitarianism. He does weigh the responsibility of the so-called neo-Machiavellians (Pareto, Mosca and Michels) "for the advent of fascism in Italy"; but they were an episodic, minor interlude. He also concludes on a note of warning about "the future errors of unreason and emotional thinking" that prevailed in the thirties; but I wish he had shown how and why these errors triumphed as universal truths, or how and why a generation that got its intellectual start with "a critique of Marxism" succumbed to the superior power of the irrational symbols of nazism. That put a more terrible and lasting end to this historical period than the economic depression. "Social thought" in the philosophical sense, as the generation of *Consciousness and Society* understood this inquiry, has been moribund ever since.

Why does this generation represent a period of "reorientation in European social thought"? First, because it was a period of transition — from social thought under the aspect of philosophy to social thought under the aspect of science. Most of the members of this generation were "transitional" figures in this sense. Most of them still stood under the shadow of Hegel, even when they were violently anti-Hegelian; most of them began their careers with a critique of dialectical materialism; all of them came to the conclusion that social thought could no longer be accommodated in traditional philosophy, whether Hegelian or Marxist. Yet, at the same time, all of them were in "revolt against positivism" as well. All of them discovered that if social thought was not philosophy, it was not science either. The "facts" in the study of man and society do not speak for themselves, as a simple-minded, scientific positivism believed, nor do they lend themselves as easily as the facts of nature to logical canons of reasoning. Both facts and logic are tainted as it were by man's own involvement in the subject he is studying.

THIS discovery, which Mr. Hughes correctly ascribes to "an enormous heightening of intellectual self-consciousness," is the other factor contributing to the theme of reorientation. It produced two striking effects: a sharp decline of the rational or the religious faith in absolute norms and truths, and an increasing awareness of the irrational components in social theory and practice. An intensified, and perhaps excessive, self-consciousness turned upon itself and, stumbling over the Pandora box of unreason in the realm of the unconscious, undermined its own proud structure. Human reality and rationality, built upon from Plato to Hegel, seemed to succumb to the radical unmasking of an awakened consciousness. This unmasking began with Marx and culminated in Nietzsche and Freud. It threatened to expose the traditional structure

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of human reality as a fraud and the traditional patterns of social thought as disguised ideologies. In the end — and in our own days — there was, in Croce's words, nothing left but "the consciousness of ourselves, and the need to make this consciousness ever clearer and more evident"; but it was a consciousness alone in the world, anxiously contemplating itself in splendid isolation and precariously shoring up its own fragments against the ruins of reality.

In both these respects — as social thinkers mediating between philosophy and science and as the advance guard of the modern movement of self-consciousness probing into hitherto unexplored depths with a hitherto unknown anxiety —the generation of *Consciousness and Society* has a permanent place in modern thought. It is a generation that, on the European side, roughly corresponds to Morton White's *Social Thought in America.* The two works complement each other and point to a suggestive contrast. Of American thinkers, only William James enters tangentially into *Consciousness and Society*; of European thinkers, only Croce, Dilthey and Mannheim enter tangentially, in their influence upon Charles A. Beard, into *Social Thought in America.* Neither Freud nor Weber found a place in the American study; yet both are now giants in contemporary social thought whereas the big guns of the American scene, say, Veblen, Holmes, or Dewey, are now surprisingly silent. Moreover, Mr. White, writing as an analytic philosopher in the late thirties, concluded that this European influence upon the "new history" in America caused nothing but intellectual muddle. It is amusing to note that Mr. Hughes, a historian writing in the mid-fifties, acknowledges indebtedness to the very influence which Mr. White considered pernicious. "The present study," he writes, "has its origins in the canons for the philosophical investigation of society which Dilthey originally established."

THIS re-discovery of Europe is not surprising, and not confined to the area of social thought. To be sure, we have made great progress in empirical research: the human sciences, especially psychology, sociology and anthropology, have grown immeasurably since the days of the European thinkers brought back to us in *Consciousness and Society.* Thus it is customary to dismiss them disparagingly as non-empirical and speculative minds. Yet is it difficult to read this study without a growing feeling that these men more than compensated for their lack of fancy research techniques. They saw that something more than scientific techniques was at stake, that the crisis of modern thought and modern man was cutting deeper, that there was urgent need for "a wholesale re-examination" of the foundations of human knowledge in history and society. They were "advanced thinkers" in the sense that they discovered problems and put forth ideas still not dreamt of in the latest piece of corporate research in the behavioral sciences. Thus an interesting intellectual trade has developed across the Atlantic: while America is exporting to Europe the new empirical, scientific and analytic techniques which are the pride and joy of our social sciences, it is again importing old ideas from Europe for a historical and philosophical interpretation of the human situation in our time.

Giant of Cosmic Despair

HENDERSON THE RAIN KING. By Saul Bellow. The Viking Press. 341 pp. $4.50.

Herbert Gold

ALL OF Saul Bellow's novels have contained intensely personal visions of desire at the dark limits of the soul where desire becomes obsession. *Dangling Man,* his early book, is a comedy about the search for personal and family significance during that gray period while his protagonist waited to be drafted; *The Victim* is a Dostoevskian psychological melodrama in which the question of responsibility between men in Bellow's "hot as Bangkok" Manhattan cracks the form of a measured naturalistic narrative. In *The Adventures of Augie March,* his first popular success, Bellow established his characteristic voice by going to his own school. Augie's "availability," which he hopes to convert to freedom, is expressed in the most compelling prose diction of the period, a free-swinging, humorous, lyrical and passionate style which plays upon the resources of colloquial street-talk and an American tradition of eclectic bookishness. *Seize the Day,* a short

HERBERT GOLD is the author of The Man Who Was Not With It. *His new novel,* The Optimist, *will be published in April.*

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novel which appeared in 1956, struck this reader at the time as one of the central stories of our day, and still does. It shows a man at an extremity of need to determine his place in the world, moving that crucial step from pity of self to perception of self in important relation to others. The style proper to Augie March is here modified by an increased gravity alternating with the sportiveness due Dr. Tamkin, one of that gallery of intellectual eccentrics whom Bellow loves so well, frauds and quacks and witch doctors who speak the truth—partially, sometimes, maybe.

Now, in *Henderson the Rain King*, Bellow has created another obsessed hero, the slovenly, aging, powerful lush of an American millionaire, Eugene Henderson, who hurtles through life in search of an answer to the voice within which cries constantly, "I want, I want, I want." He brawls, marries, fathers, starts a pig farm, and at last begins a private invasion of a fantastic Africa in order to "burst the bonds of sleep" and discover an answer to this very American *I want* which is ravaging him. He takes a guide, Romilayu, who is very much Sancho Panza, comforting him with practical prayers and an example of quiet sleep in the midst of danger. Henderson meets a tribe and a queen who present him with a formula, "Man Wants to Live," which seems for a moment to answer Henderson's *I want*; but he is not yet ready for answers. (Henderson also tragically knows: Man wants to die.)

Suffering, repeated suffering, inflicted on himself by himself, has broken Henderson's spiritual sleep and he plunges more deeply into wilderness. With offerings of love and comfort around him, he refuses, he turns away; he has lived in misery and boredom, superstitiously, just as his first African friends have allowed themselves to be tortured by the plague of frogs in their spring. Determining to do good by killing the frogs, thereby earning respite from violence and despair, this violent and despairing man succeeds only in blowing up the source of water. He then flees forward toward the main action of the book —Henderson's partial healing with the help of King Dahfu and his mystical but nonetheless stinking lion.

Now obviously this sort of fiction must be wild, perhaps irresponsible, stuff. Drowning among the debris of literary habit, many readers will clutch for innertubes and lifesavers named "Symbol," "Kafka," "Allegory." Perhaps these devices will float them away to salvation, bobbing happy as corks; perhaps they will merely bear them straight down like anchors into the briny deep of Meaning. The trouble with the comparison with Kafka is that Bellow's aura of fable is constantly washed over by humor, impulsive crea-

Skaters

All day at my window, ill and afraid,
I watched young lovers skating on the pond.
All day they circled and darted across the way.
The morning sun drew lightning from their skates
As they wrote eight, zero, Joe and Mary love.
Hand in mittened hand, they danced, they dared,
In that landscape of white hills and barren oaks
Beneath a canopy of sullen winter air.

The sky grew colder in the afternoon.
Bands of smoky cloud passed over the sun.
Snow fell gently on the skaters then,
Gathered on reindeer sweaters, pointed caps,
And melted on their brows and laughing lips.
Nothing could end the lovers' gayety:
They leaped through the hours and smiled and sang
Against the threat of wind and weathering.

And the skaters are gone. The pond is a wide, white space
Surrounded by powdered oaks and pines like walls,
And the light that sifts down from the polar wastes
Is starlight and not moonlight. I do not hear
Now it is night, and the snow no longer falls,
Laughter or loud, feigned cries of anger and fear.
There is only white space on the pond and space
In the sky and a terrible white space between me,
Dying at my window, and some lover's face.

STEPHEN STEPANCHEV

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tion, and actual, turbulent detail. Also there is no balm in symbol or ease in allegory; it is Henderson himself who always concerns us, not Everyman; it is an actual Henderson, rambling about in his dirty jockey shorts, who becomes a genuine rain king. Comic and pathetic, very slippery, he is a regular American guy resisting godliness.

If a formula of literary precedent is required, I offer a suggestion—the action is that of the Lamentations of Jeremiah combined with the Celebrations of Tarzan. This book requires of the reader a submission to playful fantasy which will surely dismay those expecting either realistic fiction or symbolic construct. The detail of an imaginary Africa, though rendered with the vividness of an actual Chicago, is, after all, an *imaginary* Africa. However, perhaps we should not lose in fiction our Tarzan-loving primitive lust for daydreamy adventure. And as Bellow implies, we need to find reality wherever we can, since we have found too much unreality in daily life.

"Me?" asks Henderson. "I love the old bitch reality, just the way she is and I like to think I am always prepared for the very worst she has to show me. I am a true adorer of life, and if I can't reach as high as the face of it, I plant my kiss somewhere lower down."

THE gory suffering and glee combined in this remark suggest much of the style and sense of the book. Henderson is not always prepared for the worst. He cannot always plant his kiss any place. He sometimes turns his back on his children and on the wife he loves despite her moral maxims. But finally he is fond of reality, and reality returns the compliment, warming to him, too. In the end there has been a symbiotic feeding between the two giants of the book, King Dahfu and Eugene Henderson. Dahfu—who emerges as part divine minstrel man, part psychoanalyst, part Moses, wholly king—seems to speak for peaceful inspiration, a state of being in virtue. This religious confidence in fate is alien to unsubmissive Henderson, but it is the object of his longing. King Dahfu finally returns Henderson, "leaping, leaping, pounding, and tingling," to society and the prospect of health.

Alfred Kazin has noted that the pursuit of health is a most frequent one in the contemporary novel. Perhaps this provides a corollary in the flesh to the spirit's pursuit of truth. Politics has been diminished as a subject by the withdrawal of significant political choice from our lives. At the same time, so-

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

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ciety and the study of manners have become increasingly irrelevant in a time of explosive threat and possibility. Here lies a paradox—political decision is muffled while science is being applied in terrible ways by the unleashed will of politicians (*they* are not muffled, alas). Where does this leave room for the novelist, traditionally concerned with politics, society, manners?

The personal, stoic road toward answering the question of how to live decently is often the most trustworthy path on the map. Parodies of this are the popular psychiatric, sexual, or togetherness solutions in many contemporary novels; these medicines are trivial in addition to causing gastric indignation and heartburn. Saul Bellow, however, is a master hypochondriac. In *Henderson the Rain King* he approaches the universe and all it contains as if they are potions for the cure of soul and body, but why should we protect ourselves against doping our way toward health when the draught is bottled with charity, wit and hope?

I want, thinks Eugene Henderson, over and over, while he paws after love, adventure, power, seriousness: I want, I want, I want! He is afflicted with a peculiarly American form of metaphysical despair. Both the comedy and the tragedy of Henderson's life lie in the rude incoherence of his passions and steadiness. He wants, but he is unable to hold. He wants, but he cannot admit another to his privacy. He wants, but in precise circumstance he is not sure exactly what he wants despite all his long labor of definition.

"The whole experience gave my heart a large and real emotion. Which I continually require." Whether it is getting shaved by force to cure the crabs, or falling in love with a sentimental woman, or hunting his soul in Africa, he wants, he wants, he wants this large and real emotion. And for him, "Truth comes in blows"—a sock on the nose, a punch in the eye, a heave at his heart.

SUFFERING is Henderson's chief occupation. Bellow's transcription of Henderson's suffering is saved from self-pity, first of all, by his recognition of the comic, then by his dramatic realization of the presence of others, and most important, by his ultimate doubt that the pursuit of health is a valid occupation for a man. To suffer with such an enthusiastic will to it must be funny: Bellow is the funniest sufferer since Gogol, an enthusiast for misery like Cervantes. To doubt that man puts himself on earth in order to find carefree attention between the sheets, cure his ulcers, eliminate hay fever, amounts to philosophy in an age which has replaced political fervor with psychological agitation. Bellow goes further. He makes prime metaphysical demands on experience.

An exemplary writer of this generation, he expresses most clearly the philosophical and religious quest necessarily contained within an abiding sense for passing things. All his work seems to ask the question, "Why am I here?" In his comic mood he answers: "Because I'm here—that's enough!" And in his mood of despair: "Because I'm here—that's not enough!" His intensely lyrical and dramatic, onflowing participation in the life of his Chicago, his Manhattan, his Africa, his universe, makes the underlying metaphysical question possible; and so his deepest answer seems to be: "Why? Because we are all here together on earth. It is both enough and not enough."

That is probably the only permanent answer to a question which never remains the same. In the meantime we have Eugene Henderson among us, always there, as Saul Bellow reports, "there and looking for trouble."

Trotsky on Himself

TROTSKY'S DIARY IN EXILE. Translated from the Russian by Elena Zarudnaya. Harvard University Press. 218 pp. $4.

Ralph Colp, Jr.

AFTER four decades of Soviet power, Leon Trotsky is the only Soviet leader whose biography is known reliably and from himself. Lenin is known through the testimony of those around him; Stalin and post-Stalin leaders by what they officially decree — and that is rarely the truth. Trotsky, at the beginning of his Soviet exile in Turkey in 1930, wrote his autobiography, *My Life.* Midway through it — in France from February to June 1935, and then in Norway from September to November — he kept a diary now published for the first time.

Trotsky, exiled to history's *coulise,* succeeded in a manner comparable only to the out-of-power Winston Churchill in vitally identifying himself with history. His topical political comments were

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read by friend and foe. His *History of the Russian Revolution*, *My Life* and the first installment of a biography of Lenin, are judged by Edmund Wilson to be probably a part of our permanent culture. The 1935 diary, filled with past and present historical comments, was part of this identification; in it, Trotsky reveals for the first time that in 1918, when Lenin doubted that a Red Army could be built, Trotsky did not doubt, created one, and saved the Revolution. To be certain and not to doubt was the *leitmotiv* of Trotsky's identification with history.

TROTSKY the diarist, while identifying with history, cannot help but record his moods and emotions. He was depressed by many things: his political defeat, his isolation from Russian friends, world depression and the consolidation of Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin, and the threat of world Fascist victory. "Old age is the most unexpected of all things," he wrote, and, quoting Lenin (quoting Turgenev) the "greatest vice" is to be more than fifty-five. Above all, Trotsky was depressed by and anxious over the fate of his twenty-seven-year-old youngest son, Seryozha, an engineer and still in Russia.

For nine months, from 1934 into 1935, as Stalin's repression tightens, there is no news of Seryozha, and Trotsky dreads the worst. Then the worst is known: Seryozha has been arrested. Thinking of Seryozha, he records in the diary Stalin's remark to his brother-in-law Kamenev: "The greatest delight is to mark one's enemy, prepare everything, avenge oneself thoroughly, and then go to sleep."

Though lacking Stalin's penchant for vengeance, Trotsky too has killed innocents at the behest of history. He remembers Soviet president Sverdlov telling him in 1918 that, on the decision of Lenin (Trotsky was absent), Czar Nicholas had been shot. Queried Trotsky, "'And where is the family?' 'And the family along with him,' said Sverdlov. 'All of them?' I asked, apparently with a touch of surprise. 'All of them!' replied Sverdlov, 'What about it?' . . . I made no reply." (Several years later in a note in his biography of Stalin,

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Trotsky intimates that Stalin engineered the Czar's killing.)

Was a young Romanov any less innocent than Seryozha? After remembering his disturbed silence, Trotsky goes on to justify the killing of Nicholas as politically "needed." He cannot explore or elaborate his troubled memories; only touch on them. He relates a talk with Paul-Henri Spaak (the present Secretary-General of NATO, then a minister in the Belgian cabinet): Spaak, "Took out a pad and began to take notes! 'And is this a Revolutionary leader?' I thought. All through our conversation Spaak kept 'agreeing' and taking notes. . . . 'Oh, is that so? This is much more serious than I thought. . . .' This note sounded in all his responses, even though in words he was 'agreeing.'" Spaak is dubbed "honest" but "a miserable character" — Trotsky cannot bear doubts or conflicts even when they are in another person.

Printed with the diary is Trotsky's Testament, written five years later in Mexico. Stalin has killed his children (*Seryozha being accused of poisoning* workers' food); killed his Russian acquaintances; in the Moscow trials, charged Trotsky with horrendous obloquy and in *absentia* sentenced him to death. In his Testament, with proud courage and in his brilliant style, Trotsky reaffirms his identification with history: now as for the past forty years he remains a Marxist; in the round he has always been right; he believes "in the Communist future of mankind"; "my Communist faith . . . gives me even now such powers of resistance as cannot be given by any religion." He concludes: "Life is beautiful. Let the future generations cleanse it of all evil, oppression, and violence. . . ."

But the man who would "cleanse" humanity cannot set down his intolerable feelings. The seeing and confident-acting exiled Trotsky—unlike the blinded and self-doubting Oedipus exiled to Colonus — does not know, cannot face, himself.

Grammar of Dissent

VOICES OF DISSENT. A selection of articles from *Dissent* magazine. Grove Press 384 pp. $3.75; Evergreen paperback, $1.95.

Raymond Williams

IT HAS been a particular pleasure and stimulus to me, as a British writer, to read this excellent collection of recent American radical essays. It had always seemed impossible to me that the great radical tradition of America could be dead; yet until quite recently, in the inevitably selected content that crossed the Atlantic, one saw the dismal English story on a larger scale: the steady migration to the thriving presses of the Cold War, and the sour reaction to mass culture, which not only blamed the masses for the fact that they were being culturally exploited, but came to see ordinary people as merely "masses" from whom the intellectual, by definition, must express his separation. There are marks of these trends in this volume and I should imagine that American radicals have to be exceptional men to refuse to play the pseudo-radical roles that capitalist society has assigned to them. The merit of *Voices of Dissent* is not only that it manifests such principled men, but that in certain contributions it goes beyond the honorable refusal into positive radical thinking.

The function of dissent is here defined by Lewis Coser: "to stay sane in an insane society." The pressures that have to be resisted can seem terrifying, especially when it is remembered how deeply most men of substance want to belong, heart and mind, to the shared purposes of their society. In certain periods, this is a tragic situation; as described in this volume, contemporary America shows major elements of this tragedy. The desire to belong to an

RAYMOND WILLIAMS is the author of Culture and Society, *reviewed in* The Nation *for February 7.*

Grand Concert by the Lake

Like Winslow Homer's *Women At Croquet*,
air flicked by parasols and spoons on glass
rounds summer evenings till the lawns turn blue

And music bending lightly in the wind
sails toward pavilions latticed on the shore
like Sunday excursions to the Chateau d'If.

Summer is yesterday, never quite here
in time's light music, frivolous in space
as Winslow's women, a gallop by Suppé.

BYRON VAZAKAS

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active and purposive society is met by a persuasive invitation to do precisely that, but the activity and the purpose can be such as to wither the heart and score the mind. Pressures to conform, of the kinds described by Maurice Stein in "Suburbia—a Walk on the Mild Side" and by William L. Neumann in "Historians in an Age of Acquiescence," are strong in any powerful modern society.

THE individual thinker may, as a first reaction, find stability in C. Wright Mills's description of his role: "the maintenance of an adequate definition of reality." Several contributions to *Voices of Dissent* exemplify this effort: comparing the realities of a society with its flattering images; rescuing the language of freedom from the stale, greedy mouths that have appropriated it for their own purposes of exploitation and control. Yet this position contains real dangers: isolation, the growth of a habit of contempt, the reduction of life to the single function of critical thought. The dissenter may find himself standing with the legion of the damned: with all those who have ended by hating common life, and to whom society as such is totalitarian. There is a very fine line between asserting a different reality and refusing all reality but one's own nonconformity. Dissent of the latter kind leads either to a corroding bitterness (usually evident in language and tone) that literally has death in its mouth, or to a simple narcissism of the kind represented in Europe and America by the cult of the outsider.

There are sick voices in *Voices of Dissent,* but there is a clear majority of other, stronger voices: Mills, with his living energy; Henry Pachter, whose critical commentary seems all experience, hardly ratiocinative at all; Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, reasoning socialism as "the name of our desire"; Erich Fromm, seeing love and integrity as "the most vital act of rebellion"; L. D. Reddick, reporting the deep strengths of the Montgomery bus boycott, and others. To such men, to the magazine which printed them and to this book which reprints them, Americans and many others are deeply indebted. For these, paradoxically, are the voices of assent: of assent to man and society, to man everywhere, and to his social nature, in whose terms alone any temporary form of society can be vitally assessed. So for those of us outside America, here are welcome colleagues from a nation we have always respected. And for Americans themselves, as I see it, here is that point of growth which it is the radical's special purpose to find.

LETTER from ROME

William Weaver

THE Palazzo Primoli is an unremarkable, late nineteenth-century building on the left bank of the Tiber; it houses Rome's Napoleonic Museum, a charming collection of curios which has the unhappy distinction of being the least-visited museum in Rome. Last month, however, a stream of Roman writers and intellectuals poured into the Palazzo, not to inspect the souvenirs of Bonaparte's glory but to see a fascinating special exhibit arranged by the French Embassy and entitled *Hommage à Commerce.*

Commerce was a singular literary quarterly, of limited circulation but vast influence, published in Paris between 1924 and 1932, directed officially by Léon-Paul Fargue, Valery Larbaud and Paul Valéry. In actual fact, though — as this exhibit graphically illustrates — the review was animated, backed and edited (in the real sense) by Marguerite Chapin Caetani, an American woman married to an Italian nobleman and composer. Princess Caetani's association with *Commerce* has a personal meaning for Italians because, in the years since the last war, she has resumed her career as an editor-publisher, bringing out twice a year the mammoth, international magazine-anthology *Botteghe Oscure.* And Italians, who know her activity through this later publication, can recognize the stamp of her personality, her taste — daring yet never flamboyant — on *Commerce.*

This exhibition is as much an homage to her as it is to her first review; it is like a marvelous scrap-book or faded family album, only the members of this artistic family are Valéry and Hofmannsthal, Dunoyer de Segonzac and Derain, St.-John Perse and James Joyce. These are some of the friends who used to gather on Sunday for dinner and the afternoon at the Caetani's Villa Romaine, near Versailles; and these are some of the names that appeared in *Commerce,* along with others even more exotic, like

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Boris Pasternak (his first publication outside of Russia was in *Commerce* VI, 1925), T. S. Eliot (first published in France in *Commerce* III) and Garcia Lorca (his *Martyre de Ste. Eulalie*, translated by Supervielle in *Commerce* in 1927, was his first publication in France).

The Princess did not confine her publishing only to friends, nor to a single clique. The index of *Commerce*, shortly to be published, shows mortal literary enemies side-by-side in her pages, and articles on Byzantine art are followed by a piece on Zen-Buddhism — a generation before it hit San Francisco. In rows of glass cases, the Palazzo Primoli exhibit recreates a rich literary world, a life that now seems remote and leisurely and enviable. In photographs we see Derain and Dunoyer leaving the Villa Romaine in a high, open touring car; Valéry on a Norman beach, impeccably dressed in tennis shoes and Homburg; a dinner-table group at a "Déjeuner Ulysse" on June 27, 1929, and beneath the photo there is the menu (Quenelles de veau, Poulet de Bresse, three kinds of wine, etc.), signed by those present, including Joyce, Romains, Chamson, Sylvia Beach, Valéry and somebody who wrote "rose as a peach" (it looks like Valéry's handwriting).

THE cases are also filled with books—the production of *Commerce's* authors—all with long and affectionate dedications by the writers to other writers, or to Marguerite Caetani. *A vous, Amie très chère* — writes Perse in a copy of *Exile — dont l'élégance morale et la noblesse de couer demeuront associés à l'envol de tant d'ouevres françaises, Fidèlement. . . .*

And over the cases are hung paintings, further witnesses of the world that centered around *Commerce*, the Villa Romaine, and the Princess. There is a lovely Braque, dedicated to Paulhan; a Masson, dedicated to Breton; a sweet Derain portrait of the Princess' daughter Lelia; a Berthe Morisot portrait of Mme. Valéry as a child; and drawings and water-colors by the Valérys themselves, including the poet's Mediterranean sketch-book and his terse, droll illustrations for the *Monsieur Teste* piece, which appeared in *Commerce* starting with the first issue.

Though it is contained in only three rooms, the exhibit is so crammed with interesting things, so completely free of padding, that it demands more than one visit. And on the return visits, you find yourself observing also the reaction of the public. Even in the dead, mid-afternoon hours, the place is never empty. Young Italians — students and budding writers — gaze at this legendary world with the wonder of discovery: so *that* was what Valéry looked like, *that* was Hofmannsthal's handwriting. . . . And the older generation, those who managed to procure stray copies of *Commerce* during the stifling period of intellectual isolation under Mussolini, admire the consistently high quality of each number of the review. Other literary magazines of the period, exhibited in the first room, have tables of contents that, for the most part, list writers long since disappeared into oblivion; but *Commerce* is remarkably free of clinkers.

Those who know Marguerite Caetani — and almost every writer in Europe does know her — are not surprised. Though she seldom leaves her comfortable apartment in Palazzo Caetani except to look at pictures or to go to her *beautiful country place at nearby Ninfa*, the Princess manages to meet and help dozens of painters and writers and musicians. Though she is not "social" (she has not used her magazine to create a fashionable salon), she is eminently sociable, and her Sunday lunches in the country during the fine weather are a worthy continuation of those at the Villa Romaine in the twenties.

But the Principessa (as she is known in Rome — as if the city had only one princess) is no mere lady bountiful, inviting artists to tea and presiding over the lunch table. Her morning mail is brought up to her in a wicker basket, and though she has assistants and advisers (the Italian writer Giorgio Bassani and the American poet Eugene Walter among them), she insists on opening every envelope and examining every manuscript herself. Like every editor, she works a lot on intuition; if she thinks somebody *ought* to be a good writer, she makes him keep submitting manuscripts until she finds something she likes. And when she discovers a writer to her taste, she isn't afraid to publish him often. Hardly a number of *Botteghe Oscure* appears without something by René Char — a poet whose international reputation owes a great deal to her insistence — or by Guglielmo Petroni an Italian novelist whom the Princess admires. Each issue, however, contains new names, drawn from the daily mail basket. Twenty-five years from now — who knows? — perhaps there will be an exhibit honoring *Botteghe Oscure*, and those may be the very names — like the Lorcas and Pasternaks of *Commerce* — that will be surrounded by the halo of fame and greatness. That is the bet that the Princess is making with the future.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 808

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 Mother's little arguments could certainly hound her. (8)
5 Tied up with a bossy sound on the far left. (6)
9 The wind of the plain or the Rockies. (7)
10 Leave it alone, boy! It might be ipped out west. (7)
11 Where you might need change for a car rug? (7)
12 Discernment certainly can't be around the corner. (7)
13 Looking for salt in the fall, usually. (7,6)
15 and 2 down Time of uprising (perhaps in league with Indians)? (7,6,7)
21 Obscuration. (7)
22 His work objective should be going well. (7)
23 British storm centers of China. (7)
24 The dumb brute I take out to change valence. (7)
25 It's a bird! It's a dog! It's a bird-dog! (6)
26 The bad character of Tristan has at heart separated by itself. (8)

DOWN:

1 Contains instruction for the keyboard? (6)
2 See 15 across
3 In Maugham's sort of bondage, it isn't being like us. (7)
4 Sounds like the early ones who tapped people on the shoulders! (They get to play before the rest of us!) (5-8)
6 Was it Legree's job to do so? (7)
7 What a ball-player usually does each year, or quits? (7)
8 Pointing out it's depressing with nothing inside! (8)
10 Noggin's word is "Stay away from them!" (8,5)
14 A call for help around the most advantageous material over the actor's apron. (8)
16 Is their taste for death unique, according to Caesar? (7)
17 Write up the music! He's out the furthest, almost! (7)
18 One couldn't say "I don't have one to my name!" (7)
19 A top one is just under the royal. (7)
20 Half the last of the working week end of a Quaker. (6)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 807

ACROSS: 4 Title page; 9 Subgenera; 10 and 2 Bring to book; 11 Stowaways; 12 Afton; 13 Semicolons; 17 Thereafter; 21 Lease; 22 Headliner; 23 Their; 24 Rainspout; 25 Cotyledon; 26 Dated. DOWN: 1 Wisest; 3 Hyenas; 4 and 1 across The Wake of the Red Witch; 5 Transliteration; 6 Emblazon; 7 Aviation; 8 Edginess; 14 Athletic; 15 Decadent; 16 Cerebral; 18 Closed; 19 Inmost; 20 Grated.

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★ The Asian-African revolt against ignorance, poverty, and colonial rule is far from over.

★ Our foreign policy, to be effective, must be consistent with the means at our disposal and the opportunities at hand.

Specifically we propose as first steps, the following:

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★ Let us encourage and support the demilitarization of tension areas, utilizing the facilities and capacities of the United Nations.

★ Let us invite the Soviet Union to enter into an agreement with us to reject war and the threat of war as an instrument of policy in our dealings with each other and thereby revive a mutual obligation under the United Nations Charter which long has suffered from mutual neglect.

★ Let us give official recognition to the plain fact that the People's Republic of China is the government of China and therefore it should occupy the China seat in the United Nations.

★ Let us greatly increase economic aid and technical assistance to other countries and let us not use such aid as a cold war device, but let us channel it through the agencies of the United Nations.

In offering these proposals we do not suggest that all problems will vanish if these things are done, but we do believe that they are a beginning toward recapturing a measure of the confidence and the good will which we formerly enjoyed before the advent of cold war.

Members of the Congress, we gravely urge the necessity for you to act. The clock of history will stand still until 1960. It is striking now. This is pivot time, and events are hinged to your initiative and your choice.

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